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PREFACE 
This briefing book on the unitary method of apportion-
ment has been prepared for use by Committee members and 
other interested parties in connection with the hearing of 
the Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation in Sacramento 
on December 16, 1981. 
The objectives of the book are two-fold: 
1) to provide a brief background on the subject, parti-
cularly for new Committee members and others who 
have not attended Committee hearings on this subject 
in the past, and 
2) to review 1981 developments as they relate to this 
issue. 
For further background information, the reader is referred 
to earlier reports of this Committee: California's Bank & 
Corporation Tax, Vol. II: Unitary Method of Apportionment, 496 pp., 
Nov. 1979 (Purlication #750); Unitary Method of Apportionment: 
A Second Look, 71 pp., Nov. 1980 (Publication #810). They may 
be purchased by contacting the Assembly Publications Office, 
P.O. Box 90, State Capitol, Sacramento 95814. 
i 
This briefing book was prepared by David Doerr, Chief 
Consultant to the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. 
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UNITARY METHOD OF APPORTIONMENT: NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
POLICY ISSUES 
ISSUE 
California uses the unitary method of apportionment, 
with world-wide combination, to determine that portion of 
the income of multistate and multinational corporations 
which is subject to tax by California. Should California'.s 
application of the unitary method of apportionment be 
revised? If so, to what extent? 
QUESTIONS 
1. Is world-wide combination, as part of the unitary 
method of allocating income, the best way to determine the· 
amount of income of multinational corporations which is 
subject to taxation by California? 
2. What are the alternatives to world-wide combination? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives? 
3. Are there unique differences between foreign-based 
corporations (and subsidiaries thereof) and domestic corpora-
tions? Should there be a difference in the formula for ' 
foreign-based corporations? If so, should there be further 
distinctions by industry groups? For example, should foreign-
based energy companies, steel c6mpanie·s, and owners of 
aqricultural lands (or their subsidiaries) continue to 
be subject to world-wide combination in the same manner as 
their domestic counterparts? 
4. What are the fiscal ramifications of the various 
alternatives? If there is a revenue shortfall, to whom should 
the tax burden be shifted? 
1 
5. What are the potential economic effects of main-
taining current law and of the various alternatives to 
current law? 
2 
B!I.CKGROUND 
The term "unitary method of apportionment" (sometimes 
referred to as "unitary tax~ which is a misnomer) refers 
to the method used by California to determine state taxable 
income of multistate and multinational corporations which do 
business in California. The term "unitary" is used to 
indicate that the entire operations of such a corporation 
are treated as a single unit and the income is allocated 
or apportioned by formula, rather than accounted for separately 
by operation or location. 
The unitary method of apportioning income to California 
for purposes of the Bank and Corporation tax has generated 
substantial controversy in recent years. The application 
of the unitary method to the "world-wide" income of multi-
national corporations has been the most significant area of 
disagreement between state tax officials and the business 
community. World-wide combination is the inclusion in the 
computation of the California tax return "world-wide" infor-
mation from the corporations comprisinq the unitary business 
with respect to profits, property, payroll and sales. 
California taxes its share of world-wide profits depending on 
its percentage of world-wide property, payroll and sales. 
Present Law 
The California franchise or income tax applies only to 
that portion of a corporation's total net income that is 
"derived from or attributable to sources within this state 11 • 
All corporations, whether created or organized in a 
foreign country or in the United States, are now treated 
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similarly under unitary apportionment principles applied by 
California. 
Where a corporation or group of related corporations 
operates both within and outside of California, the Franchise 
Tax Board first determines which corporate or intercorporate 
activities are sufficiently related to be included in the 
corporate taxpayer's unitary business income base. The 
"business income" of such unitary operations is then apportion-
ed by formula, by determining the total "world-wide" income 
of the unitary business and then apportioning a share to 
California based on a three-factor apportionment formula. 
Case law has cited Section 2510 of the Revenue and 
Taxation Code as the controlling statute in this area: 
"When the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax 
imposed under this part is derived from or attributed 
to sources both within and without the state, the tax 
shall be measured by the net income derived from or 
attributed to sources within this state in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 2 ... " 
Article 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, the Uniform 
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), provides 
guidelines to be used by the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) in 
allocating income by formula. (For text of UDITPA, see 
Appendix I, yellow pages). 
Section 25137 permits variation from the standard 
allocation and apportionment provisions when they do not 
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity 
in this state. 
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How the Unitary Concept is Applied 
When the FTB determines that the business c~nducted both 
wi thi.n and without California is unitary, the portion of the 
business income from that unitary business which is "derived 
from or att;tj:butable to sources within this state'' is 
determined by formula apportionment. This approach is 
followed where the unitary business is conducted by a single 
corporation or by separate corporations under common owner-
ship or control. 
In determining whether a single corporation with operations 
within and without California is engaged in a unitary business, 
or whether a group of separate corporations within and without 
California is required to determine its income by use of a 
"combined report", the geographic locations of the corporate 
business activities are immaterial. Foreign sources as well 
as domestic sources of income are all taken into account. 
Then an apportionment formula is applied to determine the 
amount of income derived from California sources. 
The FTB uses an arithmetic average of three factors to 
allocate unitary business income in California. The three 
factors are property, payroll and sales. 
California property, payroll and sales as a percent of 
world-wide property, payroll and sales is computed. The 
average of the three ratios is then applied to "world-wide" 
income to determine the share of income of the unitary bus-
iness which is apportioned to California. It is to this 
income figure that the California corporation tax rate is 
applied. 
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Although this formula will result in distortions in ;na.ny 
cases, the courts have repeatedly ruled that the formula 
need not be precise and that a rough approximation is 
sufficient. 
For some businesses, there are special formulas and ex-
ceptions to the general apportionment formula. 
The following example of a mythical corporation shows 
the application of the three-factor formula: 
EXAMPLE -- MYTHICAL CORPORATION 
Sales 
Property 
Payroll 
In 
california 
$1,000,000 
4,000,000 
2,000,000 
Total - all 
over the world 
$20,000,000 
40,000,000 
10,000,000 
% Calif. 
to world 
5% 
10% 
20% 
Average 11.6666% 
Total world-wide income of corp. $5,000,000 
Income allocable to California: 
World-wide income of corp. 
Unitary apportionment factor 
California Tax: 
California Income 
Bank & Corp tax rate 
TAX 
Non-Business. Income 
$5,000,000 
X ll. 6666% 
$ 583,300 
$ 583,300 
X 9.6% 
$ 55,997 
Income derived from unitary business operations is 
apportioned by formula. Other "nonbusiness'' income, i.e., 
income attributable to intangible assets or to other property 
not related to the principal or unitary business (including 
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dividends, interest, rents and royalties) is allocated 
entirely to the taxpayer's commercial domicile, i.e., the 
"headquarters" office. (This issue is now on appeal with 
the State Board of Equalization.) 
Interest expense also affects the taxability of dividend 
and interest income. In general, under Section 24344(b) 
interest expense is allowed as a deduction against business 
interest income subject to apportionment. Additional interest 
expense is deductible against nonbusiness interest and dividend 
income by the amount of their interest expense. Corporations 
which are not commercially domiciled in this state must reduce 
their interest expense by an amount equivalent to their non-
business interest and dividen~ income which would have been 
reportable if their co~~ercial domicile had been this 
state. 
Rationale For Unitary Apportionment 
The unitary method was developed early in the history of 
state taxation of corporate income. Originally it applied 
mainly to corporations with operations in several states 
of the U.S. It was believed that such corporations could 
manipulate their internal accounts in such a way as to shift 
profits earned in California or another high tax state to 
a state with low or no taxes on corporate income. As 
multinational corporations became more common, the same 
principle was applied to them. 
7 
c 
a 
This method assumes that the income of certain corpora-
ions with multiple operations or facilities cannot be 
ccurate assigned to a specific tion. 
For income of a firm which manufactures 
one state, assembles the ts into 
ished in a second state, and markets the 
on a nationwide or regional basis is treated on a unita 
basis. s concept the total income is treated as 
a s unit and no attempt is made to ne ifi-
cal what portions of the income were der 
manufacturing or assembly. 
from com-
The Alternative To The Unitarv Tax 
The alternative to the present "world-wide 
" suggested by its opponents is to rely upon 
the " accounting" method. This would allow 
a operations of a multistate or mult tional 
ct 
to continue to be trea as a un ary business 
U.S. but such firms would be 
transactions with overseas 
i to 
s of 
rm at ces reflecting fair market value. 
ir 
its 
of firms would be conducted to ensure that such inter-
transactions were conducted "at arms 1 not 
to taxes on Cali a f s. The federal govern-
ment currently uses this system purposes of 1 
income tax. 
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Arguments In Favor Of The Unltary ~ethod Of Apportionment 
Supporters of the unitary method argue that, while the 
concept may be somewhat arbitrary, and the three-factor formula 
may produce some distortions in profits taxed by California, 
in general the system works fairly to tax the complex and 
interconnected operations of rnultistate and multinational 
corporation. The alternative to the unitary system--the 
separate accounting method--would require the taxpaying 
corporation to provide a set of records reflecting the 
"arms length" transactions among subsidiaries. Since the 
California subsidiary is part of a multinational or multi-
state corporation, an assumption of "arms lenath" transactionR 
with other parts of the parent firm may be at least as arbitrary 
as the assumption underlying the unitary method. In addition, 
supporters argue that while audits of the unitary apportion-
ment rely on such things as payrolls, sales and property 
values which can be measured in the market place,the use 
of "arms length" pricing relies upon values for transactions 
where there may be no corresponding free market. Such audits, 
they argue, may be more onerous than current unitary method 
audits. 
They further argue that separate accounting is not 
working well at the federal level and would be impossible 
for a state to enforce without an army of auditors. 
Finally, supporters of the unitary method argue that 
total repeal of the unitary methodology may result in a 
large revenue loss to California. 
9 
Arguments Against the Unitary Method of Apportionment 
Opponents of the unitary method of apportionment argue 
that: 
--The factor formula is based on quest le 
assumption that property, sales and payrolls equal 
pro ts all parts of the world. This.may not be true, 
particularly for investments in foreign es that differ 
markedly from the U.S. If profits are relat higher in 
California, the unitary system exports pro ts and produces 
a lower California tax. If profits are re lower 
in California, the unitary system ts California with 
profits earned elsewhere and subjects them to Cali a tax. 
--Calculation of the payroll,sales, and property factors 
the need to prepare consolidated earn s statements 
impose unreasonable record-keeping burdens on foreign corn-
orations. 
tary system may discourage investment in new 
plants California because any investment California 
payrolls, sales or property will, the uni stern, 
cause some part of U.S. or \vorldwide ts to 
Cali even though the California s the firm 
suffer a loss. ( However, the uni stem 
investments in California in circumstances where 
relat profits earned California are larger than the 
rel , payroll and sa s 
investment. In these situat s, 
reduce California tax liability.) 
California created by 
s s will 
--The Ca]jfornia method may lead to intcrnatjonal double-
taxation of profits and frustrate efforts to coordinate 
national taxing systems. This issue arose during considera-
tion of the U.S.- United Kingdom tax treaty which would 
have banned California's unitary system. Several multinational 
firms have expressed the desire for California to abolish 
its unitary tax because some less developed "Third World" 
countries may seek to copy this system. 
--The major objections appear to be to the use of 
"world-wide" combination and the inclusion of foreign income 
and factors in the computation, rather than to the "unitary 
method of apportionment" in total. 
--Foreign domiciled businesses cite additonal special 
problems, such as: 
•in many foreign countries, historical cost data 
are not kept, making accurate computations of the. 
property factor difficult 
•accounting procedures are often not uniform 
•there are problems in foreign exchange rates 
•some countries have imposed currency controls 
•in some cases, information requested by the FTB 
violates foreign laws regarding confidentiality, 
sometimes involving defense secrets of another 
country 
•the apportionment factors do not adjust for 
cultural differences in employment in foreign 
countries, which affect calculations of value. 
Fiscal Implications 
According to the Franchise Tax Board, approximately 
72% of the net income reported for bank and corporation tax 
11 
purposes is attributable to apportioning corporations dnd 
approximately 50% of net income is attributable to multi-
national corporations, for the 1975 come year. 
Applying these percentages to the estimated 1979-80 
bank and corporation tax, the amount of tax estimated to 
be paid by corporations (approximate figures) would be as 
follows: 
Multinational corps ---$1,283,000,000 
Multistate corps ------ 564,500,000 
California-only corps-- 718,500,000 
$2,566,000,000 
It is difficult to estimate the impact of any potential 
change intheunitary approach on state revenue. In order 
to develop an accurate estimate, the current tax liability 
for each multinational corporation would have to be computed 
both by using audited world-wide unitary figures and then 
by using audited USA-only unitary and overseas separate 
accounting figures. Then a further study ld be made to 
determine the offsetting effect in revenues of the economic 
impact of the bill. Obviously, these studies would require 
a very major investment of time and money. 
The most recent estimates available are those developed by 
the Franchise Tax Board in connection th bills introduced 
1981. Refer to Appendix II, buff pages. 
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Recent Legislative History 
Although proposals to modify California's unitary method 
of apportionment were introduced in the Legislature as early 
as 1978 (AB 2363, Hughes; AB 3415, Fazio), intensive legisla-
tive review of the issue did not occur until late in 1979. 
The Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee held an interim 
hearing in Los Angeles on November 13, 1979, to hear testimony 
from a number of witnesses, including some which came from as 
far away as London, England. The primary focus at that hearing 
was AB 525, by Assemblywoman Teresa Hughes, which had been 
introduced in the California Assembly on February 12, 1979. 
Upon reconvening in 1980, the Assembly passed AB 525. 
This measure exempted foreign-domiciled corporations and their 
subsidiaries from world-wide combination under the unitary 
metbod of apportionment. These companies would still have 
been subject to the unitary method on income and factors 
within the USA. Energy companies, steel companies and owners 
of agricultural property were excluded from the bill {that is, 
would have remained subject to world-wide combination) . In 
addition, the bill had a sunset date of 1988. 
The Senate passed a different version of the bill and 
the two houses were unable to agree on common language. The 
major disagreement between the two houses was on the treatment 
of foreign energy companies (principally Shell Oil Company) • 
The Assembly did not want to include foreign energy companies 
within the provisions of AB 525; the Senate wanted them included. 
A Conference Committee report, which adopted the Assembly view 
on this issue, was adopted by the Assembly on August 31, 1980, 
but failed to secure the needed votes in the Senate. 
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As a result, a second interim hearing on the subject was 
held by the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee in San 
Diego on November 7, 1980. The central sues of AB 525 were 
reviewed by the Committee, with added emphas on energy 
company controversy. Representatives of the Franchise Tax 
Board, the administration, and the business community were 
present to testify. 
14 
1981 DEVELOPMENTS 
me of continued to be 
an issue for the rnia slature in 1981. There were 
a number of deve ts, both Sacramento Washington, D.C., 
which kept this controversial. 
Three bills, each with a different approach, were introduced 
in the California Assembly 1981. AB 55 (Hughes) was a repeat 
of AB 525 the prior year AB 765 (L. Stirling) limited the 
application unitary to domestic operations of all 
foreign based corporations. 1980 Senate 
view on this sue. AB 1238 (Deddeh) limited the unitary method 
of apportionment to domes operations of ___ companies. (For 
a more led comparison the measures as May 6, 
1981, and texts all the b 1s, see II, f pages.) 
The Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation took no 
on these 1s 1981, making them two-year bills. 
Ford Motor Company Proposal 
At the As ly Revenue Taxation Committee hearing 
on May 6, 1981, Ford Motor Company advanced an alternative 
to the proposed tary s, which members of the Committee 
believed merited study. 
Ford proposed that all corporate taxpayers be given the 
option of: 
"1. Be subjected to the existing California franchise 
tax calculated on the present world-wide combined 
unitary tax (WCUT) basis; or 
15 
2. 
a. 
b. 
( 1) 
(2) 
The company cited 
"e Those 
1 
e Those multinational 
that California's 
source income to 
second 
investment 
on income 
u.s. 
e The double 
results in 
existing in 
Pennsy , 
Georgia, etc.) 
net income and 
the state. 
• adjusting 
ternative 
significant 
concept 
(For the 
see Appendix III, 
text of 
e 
slature, on 
or 
Motor 
FTB Fiscal Stuqy 
Subsequent to hearings on the unitary bills, Assembly-
man Wadie P. Deddeh, Chairman of the Revenue and Taxation 
Committee, requested the Franchise Tax Board to provide the 
Committee with the fiscal impact, with appropriate comments, 
of several alternative approaches to the unitary issue, 
including the Ford suggestion. 
The Franchise Tax Board furnished the following tax 
rates on multinational corporations which would offset approx-
imately $500 million of state revenue loss from AB 1238, had 
it been in effect in 1979: 
Measure of tax on multinational eorps 
(1) Net worth 
(2} State net income 
( 3) Property in Ca fornia 
(4) Compensation in California 
(5) Sales in California 
( 6) Average of ( 3) , (4) and ( 5) 
Tax rate 
.14% 
s. 00% 
.15% 
1.01% 
.20% 
.24% 
For the text of the Franchise Tax Board response and 
Chairman Deddeh's tter, see Appendix IV (pink pages). 
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Congressional Bills 
Bills have been introduced in the u.s. Congress to 
res the use by States of the unitary method of apportion-
ment determining a state's share of taxable corporate 
income. In 1978, the federal administration attempted to 
limit the states' use of this apportionment method by pro-
vis in the U.S.-United Kingdom Tax Treaty. The U.S. 
Senate refused adoption of this portion of the treaty. 
In 1981, Congressman Conable introduced HR 1983 in the 
House and Senator Mathias introduced s. 655 in the Senate. 
According to the Senator, his measure would "conform the 
state rules to the Federal rules with the very narrow areas 
of (i) the time at which states tax the foreign source income 
of foreign affiliates, and (ii) the quantity or portion of 
foreign source dividends which are taxed. 
"These results would be accomplished as follows: 
"First, the proposed legislation would provide that a 
state may not take into account or include in income subject 
to tax the income of any foreign corporation in any year prior 
to the year in which such income is included in income subject 
to tax under the Internal Revenue Code. Thus, the foreign 
source income of a foreign subsidiary of a u.s. parent corpora-
would be taxed only if and to the extent paid back to 
the U.S. as a dividend or deemed paid back by application 
Subpart F. In the case of a foreign parent corporation of a 
u.s. subsidiary, the foreign source income of the fo 
parent (and any of its foreign affiliates) would never be taxed 
because under the Internal Revenue Code 
taxed by the Federal Government. 
1 ~ 
income is not 
"Second, in the case of dividends received by a U.S. 
parent corporation from a foreign subsidiary, the proposed 
legislation would permit a state to tax no greater portion 
of that dividend than the Federal government effectively taxes. 
The excluded portion of any dividend would be determined by 
multiplying the amount of the dividend by a fraction. The 
numerator of that fraction is the total amount of tax with-
held at the source on all such dividends plus the total amount 
of taxes which by application of section 902 and section 960 to 
all such dividends, the u.s. parent corporation is deemed to 
have paid. The denominator of the fraction is 46 percent of 
all such dividends. For the purpose of applying this fraction, 
the amount of the dividend includes the amount of any gross-up 
under section 78. 
Example 
1. Amount of dividend actually received .••.••. $115.50 
2. Gross-up dividend to reflect 23 percent 
foreign tax rate ••..•.....•.•.•••.•••••.••• $150.00 
3. Foreign taxes paid (23% x $150) ••.•.••••••• 34.50 
4. Grossed-up dividend x 46 percent ••.••..•••. 69.00 
5. Item 3 divided by item 4 (in percent)...... 50 
6. Excluded portion of dividend ($150 x 0.50). $ 75.00 
"The rationale for this exclusion of a portion of a foreign 
source dividend is the same as the rationale for the foreign tax 
credit--the avoidance of double tax. However, the result is not 
to require the states to allow a credit for foreign taxes which 
would tend to wipe out all state tax on foreign_ source dividends 
19 
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"These are not true market transactions in the sense 
that they represent nothing more than a company doing business 
with itself. They are internal bookkeeping transactions and 
involve no real transfer of revenue outside the corporate 
organization. 
"When the various divisions are in different jurisdictions 
which have different rates of taxation there is an obvious 
opportunity to play a "shell-and-pea" game in order to avoid 
taxes. If the refining division faces higher taxes than the 
crude producing division, taxes can be reduced simply by increas-
ing the price at which crude oil is sold to the refining division. 
As a result, the refining division makes little or no profits and 
pays little or no taxes, while the producing division makes lots 
of money where the tax rates are low. In addition, it is not 
unknown for an international oil company to set up off-shore 
companies specifically for the purpose of avoiding taxes. 
"Two points should be made. First, all integrated (or 
"unitary") corporations that operate across jurisdictional 
boundaries are capable of such manipulation. In terms of sheer 
magnitude, however, nothing matches the capability of the major 
oil companies. Second, it is important to recognize that this 
shifting of profits need not involve fraud or other illegality. 
The Internal Revenue Service (as well as the tax authorities in 
other nations) uses the so-called "arm's-length" method of 
accounting in assessing the legitimacy of intracorporate 
transfer prices. According to this system, transfer prices 
used for an item would be compared to the price that would pre-
vail in a true market, or "arm's-length", transaction. In the 
petroleum industry, at any given time, there is never a single 
21 
price for crude oil, gasoline, or any other petroleum product. 
There are clusters of "market" prices which reflect various 
long-term contract prices and spot market prices. The absence 
of any one clear "market price" gives considerable latitude to 
managers in setting intracorporate transfer prices. 
"In comparison with the necessity of untangling a host of 
intracorporate transactions and comparing them against an arm's-
length standard, the unitary method presents no extraordinary 
problems of fairness or workability. In fact some tax scholars 
have found it a theoretically superior instrument of tax policy. 
But, tax theory aside, there is one overwhelming argument for 
the unitary approach: it can actual be used to collect taxes. 
It is no exaggeration. to say that the arm's-length method 
completely fails to provide the states with a workable method 
for taxing corporate income earned within their jurisdictions." 
(For the complete text of the Cory article, see Appendix VI, 
blue pages.) 
u.s. General Accounting Office Study 
"Separate accounting 11 as administered by the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service, which is the proposed alternative to world-
wide combination under the unitary method of apportionment, was 
the subject of criticism in a report by the u.s. General 
Accounting Office released September 30, 1981. 
According to the report: 
"When multinational corporations price transactions with 
their subsidiaries, they often have the opportunity to take 
advantage of disparate corporate tax rates by shifting income. 
22 
Ideally, such prices are adjusted by IRS under Code Section 482 
to those for similar transactions between unrelated parties--
the so-called "arm's length standard". However, IRS often has 
difficulty identifying a true arm's length price on which to 
base adjustments. 
"In its review of current IRS examination data on 519 u.s. 
multinationals, each having assets over $250 million and having 
engaged in transactions with its foreign subsidiaries, GAO 
found that only 3 percent (12 of 403) of IRS' total recommended 
section 482 adjustments to reported income were based on a true 
arm's length price. The remaining adjustments were based on 
estimated prices constructed by IRS using complex guidelines 
prescribed by the Department of the Treasury--guidelines which 
have caused administrative burden and uncertainty both for IRS 
and taxpayers." 
Included among the recommendations of the GAO is one 
to the Secretary of the Treasury to "b~gin a study to identify 
and evaluate the feasibility of ways to allocate income under 
Section 482, including formula apportionment, which would lessen 
the present uncertainty and administrative burden created by 
the existing regulations. 
The Department of Treasury and the IRS are in disagreement 
with this recommendation. 
(For excerpts from the GAO study, see Appendix VII, green 
pages.) 
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u.s. su2reme Court Cases 
On November 9, 1981, the u.s. Supreme Court agreed to 
two cases relating to the unitary method of apportionment. 
The issue in the California case--Container Corp. of 
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 81-523--is whether it is con-
stitutional for the state to include income from a concern's 
ign subsidiaries in calculating corporate income tax. 
The justices also agreed to hear a case from Ill is, 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 8 349, 
involving a taxing method almost identical to California's. 
In a holding two terms a dispute between Mobil 
Oil Co. and the state of Vermont, high court ruled that 
dividend income from the foreign subs s of a multi-
national corporation headquartered elsewhere can be inc 
in a state's apportionment formula. 
24 
APPENDIX I 
Text, Uniform Division of Income 
for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA) 
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§ ?.:11n. 
§ 
§ 
§ 2.5 ?.5. 
§ 
§ 
§ 251?.-S. 
/l. ')C \29 "i ..:.J.~ • 
~ 25 30. 
§ C'c-'31 .:~ ... d • . 
~ 132. 
§ 25133. 
§ '1.'5134. 
§ ~5135. 
§ 25136. 
§ 2.'5137. 
§ 2.5138. 
§ 2..')139. 
§ ?.5140. 
Definitions. 
(a) •Business 
activity in 
includes income 
management, 
the 
(b) 
trade or 
(c) 
form of re:nuncration 
(d) g 
income. 
1512.2. 
<tlloc,tion 
!.l;:ahle in 
of 
jurisdiction to 
whether, in fact, 
inclusive, 
context 
business 
allocate 
For r)l]rposes of 
a tnpayer is 
net income 
the 
net income tax 
not. 26 

2.':1128. J:5~_,,;nc!.S i;·wo:·ne. All ht~~;n<:'>S inco;n(: ::'t:dl h-: :'<r;.;ortit:;n..:n to 
thi~ sta!c by mdL~:;lyi:lg tLe inet)IDC by a fr:•cti•m, n::, .lcr:; tor of ,,-h;::h 
is the property factor plus U1e payrcll f:,ctor J?lus the ·s factor, :md the 
denominator of 'Nhich is three. 
25129. Property factor--defined. The property factor is a fraction, 
the numerator of which is the average v:due of the taxpayer's real and 
tangible personal property owned or used in this state dming 
the income year ar-.d the denominator of is the average value of 
all the taxpayer's real and tcmgible pcrson?J property owned or rented and 
used during the income year. 
25130. Property valuation. Property owned by the taxpayer is v:<Jued 
at its original cost. Property rentc~d by the taxpayer is valued at eight times 
the net annual rental rate. Net annual rental rate is the annual rental rate 
paid by the taxpayer lc:;.s any annual rental rate received by the taxpayer 
from subrentals. 
25131. Average value of property. The average value of property 
shall be determined by averaging the values at the beginning and ending 
of the income year .but the Franchise Tax Board may require the 
averaging of monthly values during t,lte income year if reasonably 
required to reflect properly the average value of the ta:q>ayer's property. 
25132. Payroll factor--defined. The pa)'Toll factor is a fraction, the 
numerator of which is the total amount paid in this state during the 
income year by the taxpayer for con,pensation, and the denominator of 
which is the total compensation paid everywhere dming the income year. 
25133. Compensation. Compensati:m is paid in this state if: 
(a) The individual's service is performed entirely within the state; or 
(b) The individual's service is performed both within and without the 
state, but the service performed without the state is incidental to the 
individual's service within the state; or 
(c) Some of the service is performed in the state and (1) the base of 
operations or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which the 
service is directed or controlled is in the state, or (2} the b2se of operations 
or the place from which the service is directed or controlled is not in any 
state in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual's 
residence is in this state. 
25134. Sales £actor--defined. The sales factor is a fraction, the 
numerator .of which is the total sales of the tax1Jayer in this state during 
the income year, and the denominator of which is the total sales 
taxpRver everywhere during the income year. 
25135. Sales ofhmgible personal property. Sales of tangible personal 
property are in this .state if: 
(a) The property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the 
United States government, within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point 
or other conditions of the sale; or 
(b) The property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, 
or other place of storage in this stale and (1) the purchaser is the United 
States government or (2) the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the 
purchaser. 
25136. Other sales. Sales, other than sales of tangible personal 
property, are in this state if: 
(a) The income-producing activity is performed in this state; or 
{b) 'I11e income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this 
state and a greater prorzortion of the income-producing acti\·ity is 
performed in this state than in any other state, ba<,ed on costs of 
performance. 
Pert~ rno:'<~-'foc"v••d ov!,id• Ccr:L;_ ..... ;o_-~ ··the a~'><.~r:.bly, in 
wh.o . .-..e corn;.x::HH'"!1li '""~"re fs~v·}c;.:,'"<.i uu'q({e C_.St:ifC.TTJ.a ~.S. LitA 
ta..nb..-;Sle per~o::ud P':JK!rty" ar,d Ls, thcrelc,} not pror~dy 
!Mtx-oclc 4 Wilc-0.r c:o, GJ. St. M. of , JHm"'J' 11, !978. 
~ or..tJ ~;;han of ~nt .. :>h9·~-J. d..,b, !<...C~;r1tiet..--- ln 
~rmula,. th<" uring "tcncy prop-rly !.-r.ob--d S<-ction lo 
sa.k-s of 1-hort-term dcvt k'·curity v. ork-:..)g c&c~tal it:Vt""/)trnent. 
Corvps.ny, Cd. St 13-d. of Equal, May (, Hid). 
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, could 
of 
11 
We a number of problems 
which we may not would be happy to discuss 
this matter further with you or members of your As as you are 
this , we will discuss it with any other party 
without your direction or concurrence. 
-T~ 
51 
Corre 
APPENDIX IV 
se Tax 
on Al 
Sources of Revenue 
52 

i 
A 4) 1 or (5 
A tax (4) and (5) 
as to the 
we 
one 
hear this ect 
se 
s 
WAD IE 
WPD:j 
Enc 
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P. Deddeh 
2 
worth 
Number of 
8,467 $358.5 billion 
Required 
Tax Rate 
0.14% 
estimated the increase in the bank and corporation tax rate 
all and (2) multinationals only that would be 
to raise replacement revenues. 
(1) State Net Income -
All Corporations 
(2) State Net Income -
Multinationals 
only 
Number of 
Corporations 
154,468 
8,682 
Amount (est.) 
$20 billion 
$10 billion 
Additional 
Tax Rate 
2.5% 
5.0% 
The of imposing a higher rate on nonmultinational corpora-
tions not benefiting from AB 1238 (at least in the short run) is doubtful. 
Factor 
Number of 
Multinationals 
7,564 
7,565 
Amount 
$330.3 billion 
49.6 billion 
$209.8 billion 
Required 
Tax Rate 
0.15% 
1.01% 
0.24% 
To the extent such supplemental taxes as disincentives 
for California , corresponding revenue would be less than expected. 
Also, efforts by to minimize the impact of an additional tax on 
, , or sales would simultaneously cause a reduction in 
franchise tax revenues over what would otherwise result by reducing 
numerator factors used in the apportionment formula. Indeed, any 
tax on property in California may be contested on 
grounds as possibly violating Article XIII A property tax 
limitations. 
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• comments these estimates should be directed to 
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APPENDIX VI 
"Oil Companies' Disappearing Profits: 
A Case for the Unitary Method", 
by Ken Cory, in Tax Notes, 
May 25, 1981 
60 
• Controller of the State of Cali-the Chairman of the California Franchise is the chairman of the 
Commission and oversees Cali-
taxation based on world-
as an 
mulfistate and multinational corpora~ 
avoid state income taxes 
the use transfer states that the arm's-
method of taxation is no match for the 
transactions of major corporations. He 
the imposition of federal limits on the 
method would threaten 
and aggravate their 
has 
at 
the 
less apparent but no less real. 
as the Administration 
return a share of 
to the states. A great deal has 
the failure of the international oil 
their share of federal income taxes, but 
written about ir1e increased tax burden 
other businesses. Even less has been 
of the international oil companies 
E IL IES' 
Dl 
TH 
to avoid state taxation, and the added burdens this places 
on other state taxpayers as the states scramble to find 
added revenues to finance their new responsibilities . 
oil profits require a reexamination of the inter-
national oil companies' to avoid state taxation and 
force smaller, less businesses to 
share of the taxes. The Citizen/labor 
recently issued a report the 
from state revenue 
" ... In 1979, Conoco, Amoco, Exxon and Mobil paid 
state income taxes 0.3 percent, 0.4 
percent, 0.9 and 1.4 percent of their total 
corporate in state income taxes, respectively. 
These figures are less than the rate paid by the 
average famiiy of four $16,000 the year 
before. 
" .. . In Colorado, Service reported no 
taxable income 1978, O?l>.<:rl•HR combined sales in 
the state of $33. 7 million. 
" ... Wisconsin fared even 
Exxon, Gulf, Tenneco Union of 
alleging that their oil business in the state was a 
proposition, and therefore no state 
income taxes." 
With other industries 
a greater burden, the 
the international oil 
matter. Some states have 
by using sales taxes on 
Such taxes hardly address 
falls directly and 
sophisticated approach is 
Transfer Price Shell Game 
The states' in 
the shock of energy prices 
governments to carry 
effective state taxation of 
has become a very serious 
to get at the problems 
or gross receipts taxes. 
since their burden 
around what are calied "transfer " These are the 
prices that one division or corporate subsidiary of a 
vertically company other divisions or 
Rising oil profits 
International oil 
state taxation .. .. 
of the 
avoid 
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overall corporate 
state to state, in 
of the corporation's 
the basis of the 
within the juris-
laxation is not without 
determining what is 
agreed that a 
do little or no 
treated as a unitary 
rental operation 
in another is 
chain a state 
earned by the 
closer cases where the 
be reasonably 
clear and 
operated as 
reality that is 
for the 
to tolerate 
but they 
of multinational 
the worldwide 
determine what 
unfair taxation o( 
the point. The 
determine what part of 
multistate or multi-
been earned 
earned outside the 
contribution did the 
earnings of the 
question for any 
obvious that the 
method, multi-
successful in pro-
states to use the 
a bitter fight in 
May 25, 1181 
the Senate over a provision in the United Kingdom Tax 
Treaty limiting the unitary method. Ultimateiy a reserva-
tion to the provision prevailed by a close margin. The 
unitary method has also withstood a number of broad-
based challenges. In two recent cases-brought by 
Mobil and Exxon-the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
of the unitary method and rejected claims 
that worldwide apportionment amounts to double 
taxation. 
It Is Irrational to rely on a system that permits 
40 percent of manufacturing profits to remain 
out of the range of effective taxation. 
These courtroom defeats have encouraged the oil 
companies and multinationals to focus their opposition to 
the unitary method on legislative remedies. Republican 
Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., and Rep. Barber Conable, 
the ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means 
Committee, have introduced legislation to prevent states 
from using the unitary method to tax multinational cor-
porations. Needless to say, the bills have very powerful 
support. Advocates of the bills are now interested in 
attaching some form of the legislation to the pending 
tax-cut bill. This strategy could force Congress to con-
sider the unitary method in a loaded political setting that 
would hardly be conducive to a deliberate exploration of 
the issues. 
It is worth noting that the federal government has similar 
problems in dealing with transfer prices and a strong 
argument can be made for the use of the unitary approach 
by the internal Revenue Service. While the U.S. Treasury 
Department supported the U.K. Tax Treaty and the 
Mathias bill, it has used the unitary approach itself. 
Unfortunately, the IRS has not done so systematically, 
and it certainly has not done so with the international oil 
companies. 
With the rapid increase in both energy prices and 
profits, we simply have no choice but to find an effective 
means of taxing the international oil companies. It is 
irrational to rely on a system that permits 40 percent of 
manufacturing profits to remain out of the range of 
effective taxation. To ask that the states do so in the 
context of the current economic policies borders on 
madness. It requires other businesses whose profits are 
already suffering to bear more than their share of the 
burden. The unitary method may not be a perfect solution, 
but it is a reasonable, workable, and equitable approach 
and at the moment we have no other. 
READER COMMENTS WELCOMED 
. We'd lika to publish reader comments on this 
article in our "Letters to the Editor" column. If 
you'd like to make your views known, please write 
us promptly. 
Please note that letters must be signed, and that 
we reserve the right to edit them in the interest of 
brevity. However, the full texts of all letters that we 
receive will be made available in the Tax Notes 
Microfiche Edition. 
-1-------------------------~-------------------------CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS 
MATSUNAGA BILL WOULD GIVE INVESTMENT CREDIT TO 
RACE HORSE BREEDING SYNDICATES. The Senate Finance 
Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management held a 
postponed last week on a series of "miscella-
neous" tax bills. Tax Notes, May 11, 1981, p. 1064for 
a of the bills considered at the hearing.) 
In to the bills previously scheduled for a 
hearing, the Finance Subcommittee also heard testimony 
on S. 450, a bill introduced by Finance Committee member 
Spark Matsunaga, D-Hawaii, which would grant an invest-
ment tax credit to persons who invest up to $100,000 in 
"work and breeding horses." The principal beneficiaries of 
the bill would be investors in race horse breeding syndi-
cates. Doc 81-4843 
ESTATE TAX HEARINGS TO CONTINUE. Sen. Steven D. 
Symms. A-Idaho, the Chairman of the Senate Finance 
Subcommittee on Estate and Gift Taxation, has an-
nounced that his subcommittee will continue its hearings 
on major estate tax issues on June 5. For earlier coverage 
of the Subcommittee's hearings, see Tax Notes, May 11, 
1981, pp, 1079-1080, and April 27, 1981, p. 952. 
The June 5 hearing will "focus on particular problems of 
the estate and gift tax laws, including the special use 
valuation for farm property and the interaction of estate 
lax laws with the gift tax," according to the hearing 
TAX 25, 1981 
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announcement. The bills to be considered at the hearing 
include the following: 
• Abolition of Estate Tax. S. 404 would repeal the 
federal estate and gift tax. 
• Exclusion; Marital Deduction. S. 395 would increase 
the federal estate and gift tax exclusion to $600,000 
and provide an unlimited marital deduction. 
• Exclusion; Use Valuation. S. 858 would increase the 
federal estate and gift tax exclusion to $600,000 and 
revise the rule relating to the special use valuation of 
farmland. 
• Marital Deduction. S. 574 would allow a marital 
deduction of up to $750,000 and would "provide a 
similar deduction for heirs other than the spouse." 
• Crop Share Rentals. S. 23 would "make it clear that 
crop share rentals qualify as a standard of valuation 
under section 2032A." 
• Retroactive Use Valuation. S. 557 would allow estates 
that filed estate tax returns before July 13, 1978, to 
elect the special use valuation for farmland. 
• Gift Tax Reporting. S. 995 would permit the reporting 
of gift tax on an annual basis. 
Persons wishing to testify at the June 5 hearing must 
submit requests in writing to the Finance Committee not 
later than May 29, 1981. Doc 81-4844 
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APPENDIX VII 
Excerpt, Comptroller General's 
Report to the House Committee on 
Ways and Means, on the Subject 
of Determining the Income of 
Multinational Corporations, 
September 30, 1981 
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COtviP'J'kCJLLI":}z Gt~r\Ekl\ , 'S 
Rl'~fJO!<T TO Ttii:. HOUS I:: 
COI'-lhl'l''l'i·,l:, ON WAYS AND 
MEA.NS 
IN Dr:Tr:KMIN ING THr~ INCOME OF 
MULT INA'l' IONAL CORPORATIONS, 
IRS COULD BETTER PROTECT 
U.S. TAX INTERESTS 
DIGES'l' 
Multinational corporations have both the in-
centive and the opportunity to shift income 
between jurisdictions to take advantage of 
disparate corporate tax rates. One incentive 
is minimization of taxes. The opportunity 
lies in the pricing of interorganizational 
transactions. Obviously, possession of incen-
tive and opportunity does not axiomatically 
lead to abuse--but to tax administrators, Amer-
ican and foreign, it represents a vulnerability 
to guard against. 
IRS, however, has not yet developed baseline 
information on the incidence and magnitude of 
multinational corporation noncompliance in 
terrns of improper shifting of income. Thus, 
IRS ·has no sound basis for determining the 
amount of audit resources to be assigned to 
address the problem, nor for gauging the suc-
cess of those resources that are applied to it. 
Further, IRS enforcement difficulties are 
compounded by the complexities involved in 
measu ing the amount of income misallocated 
in those instances where this is believed to 
have occurred. Ideally, interorganizational 
pr ing i to be adjusted to that for similar 
transact ns between unrelated parties--the so-
called "arm's length standard." 
However, in the modern economic system of mul-
tinational corporate business, a true arm's 
length price can rarely be identified. When 
an arm's length price cannot be identified, 
rtrnent of Treasury regulations for Inter-
nal Revenue Code Section 482 provide both the 
corporate taxpayer and the IRS examiner some 
guidance for arriving at a constructed price. 
The regulations and the resulting enforcement 
65 GGD-81-81 
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process, hGivcver, create an unacc ,-;)) 1 e 1 ,_·v•?l of 
uncertainty and a sirjnificdnt <H1m ist_r~1Live bur-
den both for corporate t_axpayers and lHS ex.:JHd_ners · 
For example, there is often no similar trans-
action on which to est_ablish an arm's length 
price. In these instances, the Treasury regu-
lations do not provid~ corpo~ate taxpayers with 
sufficient certainty for planning their finan-
cial strategies and considering the tax conse-
quences of their pricing of intercorporate 
transactions. IRS, faced with the same lack 
of certainty, must construe£ an est ed price 
for adjustment purposes. Both corporate tax-
payers and IRS examiners have characterized the 
end result of the adjustment process as being 
unpredictable •. 
The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee 
asked GAO to study section 482 e forcement. GAO 
reviewed current IRS examinat ata on 519 U.S. 
multinational corporations, each! ~ving assets 
over $250 million and each having engaged in 
transactions with their foreign subsidiaries. 
GAO found that only 3 percent (12 of 403) of IRS' 
total recommended section 482 adjustments to re-
ported income for such transactions were based on 
a true arm's length price. These adjustments 
amounted to 3 percent ($7.4 million of a total 
$277.5 million increase) of the total income ad-
justed for section 482 issues. The tax impact 
of the total $277.5 million in adjustments, while· 
not known precisely, can be estimated using a cor-
porate tax rate of 48 percent at $ 33.2 
million. (Seep. 29.) 
While IRS has only limited resources, the num-
ber and volume of complex international inter-
corporate transactions as well as the amounts 
of income involved continue to grow. In the 
short term, IRS and Treasury should, GAO be-
lieves, make several specific improvements in 
the way they presently administer section 482. 
In addition, IRS should consider ways to get 
a measure of corporate noncompliance regarding 
arm's length pricing, and Treasury should begin 
a study to ascertain whether ways exist to make 
section 482 enforcement easier to ister, 
more certain, and more equitable for all con-
cerned. (See pp. 24 and 53 to 54. 
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IRS CAN H1PROVE ITS CURRENT 
S-t::cTi\SN- -4~f2--ENl:~Ol{CEN~i'>T-i'--AC'l' l VITI ES 
IRS needs more management information than it 
now has to measure what it is doing to enforce 
section 482 against what needs to be done. 
Lacking such information, IRS cannot determine 
with reasonable assurance the impact of its 
current efforts nor adjust its strategy as may 
be necessary to make the best use of its lim-
ited resources. 
Considerable information is available within 
IRS concerning IRS' enforcement activities and 
the operations of multinational corporations, 
but this information has not been analyzed to 
answer management's needs. The case-by-case 
results of IRS' section 482 enforcement activi-
ties are documented in various reports prepared 
during the examination and appeals processes. 
Information on the operations of multinational 
corporations is also available to IRS from the 
Form 2952 which must be submitted by U.S. cor-
porations for each foreign subsidiary they con-
trol. (See pp. 9 to 11.) 
Other information IRS needs is not so readily 
available. For example, IRS needs a better 
idea of the extent of noncompliance with sec-
tion 482 regulations that exists within the 
universe of multinational corporations. 
IRS has, in the past, shown that it can respond 
to similar problems in developing management 
strategies where unknown factors exist. IRS 
now needs to focus its expertise on ways to 
obtain a better measure of the total noncom-
pliance with section 482 that exists in the 
multinational corporate universe. (Seep. 11.) 
MENTS SHOULD BE EXTENDED 
IRS examiners use the form 2952 as their start-
ing point for most examin.:1.tions involving inter-
national transactions. Data provided on this 
forrn is critical t_o the successful identifica-
tion of many' section 482 adjustments. Section 
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6038 of t.he Internc:tl Rev(:nue C:ode aut"hc;ri ,··s 1!\S 
to :ccquire this information only frnrn lJ. S. p<n·,,nt 
corporations, but similar infonna t ion i ~; a J ~;o 
needed for U.S. subsidiaries of fon.:-ir3n p<1rents. 
In 1974 there were 6,538 controlled u.s. corpor-
ations with assets totaling more than $76 bil-
lion. GAO believes that having similar information 
readily available for these types of corporations 
would enhance IRS' identification and examination 
of section 482 issues in international transactions 
between U.S. subsidiaries and their foreign parents. 
(See pp. 18 to 20.) 
TREASURY SHOULD ADJUST THE 
SAFE HAVEN RATE AS NECESSARY -·------ ·-·-~--~-··----
TO MORE CLOSELY REFLECT THE 
REAL COST OF BORROWING 
Another·needed change concerns the use of the 
safe haven interest rate, a ed rate of in-
terest which IRS examiners are rmitted to use 
in lieu of an arm's length price in certain 
types of transactions as a basis for making in-
come adjustments. The economic cl te since 
1968 has produced rapidly changing interest 
rates on the open market. The safe haven in-
terest rates established by Treasury have not 
kept pace. (See pp. 15 to 16.} 
GAO's analysis showed that 83 of the 84 section 
482 adjustments involving loan or advance trans-
actions made between August 1972 and June 1975 
in its sample were based on a safe haven inter-
est rate of 5 percent. During the period when 
these adjustments were made, the prime interest 
rate was always higher than the 5 percent rate, 
ranging from a low of 5.25 to a high of 12 per-
cent. Treasury implemented a new, higher adjust-
ment rate of 12 percent in Ju , 1981. This new 
rate has already been overtaken by the continuous 
rise in the cost of money which has seen the prime 
rate reach about 20 percent. (Seep. 17.) 
Safe haven interest rates which are substan-
tially lower than the open market rate can re-
sult in U.S. corporations reporting less in-
come for tax purposes. Further, such safe 
haven rates are unfair from the perspective of 
those U.S. corporations which cannot use them. 
Thus, GAO believes Treasury should adjust the 
safe haven rate as often as nece snry to lfl·"1ke 
the rate realistically reflect the cost of Lor-
rowing on the open market. (See pp. 23 to 24.) 
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AD!:.liN ISTERit;G 'l'HE AR:•1' S LE1'1GT.d STAb~DARD 
u~N m: l'-C URRENi' ---REGULA:fr ON s s --UNCE RTAfN-
AND--BU RDi~-.:~-se5ME-1'ooorn-:rR.S-A:Nr5 T 1\Xp AYERs 
--~ ~~ ------
Making income adjustments using the arm's 
length standard has posed administrative bur-
dens on both IRS and corporate taxpayers. 
Because of the structure of the modern busi-
ness world, IRS can seldom find an arm's 
length price on which to base adjustments 
but must instead construct a price. A con-
structed price is at best an estimate. Be-
cause Treasury regulations do not provide 
sufficient guidance, corporate taxpayers 
lack reasonable assurance concerning how 
income on intercorporate transactions that 
cross national borders will be adjusted and 
the enforcement process is difficult and 
time-consuming for both IRS and taxpayers. 
The current regulations provide some guidance 
for those instances in which an arm's length 
price cannot be identified but, too frequently, 
the examiner must use considerable judgment in 
dealing with data that does not directly relate 
to the specific situation at hand. Adjustments 
in which an examiner was able to identify an 
arm's length price resulted in only 3 percent 
($7.4 of $277.5 million) of total adjusted in-
come and constituted only 3 percent (12 of 403) 
of all section 482 adjustments in GAO's sample. 
Adjustments for 87 percent of total adjusted in-
come were based on the safe haven rules and var-
ious alternative techniques permitted by the 
regulations. The remaining adjustments were ar-
rived at by methods which could not be deter-
mined from available documentation or were not 
applicable to the arm's length standard. (See 
p. 29.) 
Whether or not an arm's length price is obtain-
able, administering the regulations is a com-
plex proces~;. An examiner must identify ques-
tionable transactions, perform a functional 
analysis, and search for a comparable uncon-
trolled price. If such a pri~e is not identi-
fiable, the exurniner must construct one using 
alternative techniques. The process as a 
whole t_hus c1.eates administrative burden and 
a degree of uncertainty that is unacceptable 
for both examiner and taxpayer. {See pp. 36 
to 40.) 
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SllOULD SfXTIO~~ 482 AIJ,JIJST:~I-;V!'S BE 
.'1/\Df: HC)-RE (j:;;~'l;~\ 1-t,f ~\N D LESS- l J J\ lJ!. ;J ;;o:•1E? 
~-- '"--~-- --- -- ·- -
TRl·~l\SURY SllOULD SEEK 'l'!lE f.!'.JS\\i·;R 
For some time, parties affected by and 
know] c:dgeabl e about arm's 1 Pngth adjust It lent s---
corporate taxpayers, courts, experts in the 
field, and officials at IRS--have criticjzcd 
section 482 enforcement unrler ihe current 
regulations on the basis t.hat ( 1) tlle .:-i!la-
lytical approach to determining d rrn' s 1 engt h 
prices often leads to unreasonable results and 
(2) the examinations require extensive corpo-
rate expense and labor. In addition, a sub-
stantial body of expert opinion and several 
court decisions have also criticized the high 
degree of burden and uncertainty posed by the 
current regulations. (See pp. 43 to 4 7. ) 
IRS examiners told GAO they believe that, under 
the current regulations, some r ential section 
482 adjustments are not being d(;ve1oped. They 
stated that section 482 work is "high risk 
venture" where much audit work can result in 
little additional tax. 'They pointed out t.hat, 
because of this, some examiners might not de-
velop a section 482 adjustment because of the 
difficulty involved in reaching an agreement 
on an arm's length price or on the basis for 
making the adjustment. IRS examiners attrjbuted 
this situation to both the difficulties in the 
enforcement process and the time it takes to do 
the work. (See pp. 40 to 43. ) 
GAO's statistics on the section 482 adjustments 
IRS made can be interpreted to lend some cre-
dence to the examiners' comments. For example: 
--Only 200 of the 519 multinational corpora-
tions in GAO's sample had section 482 adjust-
ments involving their foreign subsidiaries. 
--The bulk of the total $277.5 million was con-
centrated in only a few of the 403 total ad-
justments. Eleven of the 403 adjustments 
accounted for over one-half of the $277.5 
million. 
--Adjustments involving the sale of tangible 
property, the category of intercorporate 
transact.ion where t.he largest amounts of rev-
enue are at issue, were also concentrated. 
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'l'hirty-five u.s. parents ann 89 of their for-
eign subsidiaries experienced adjustments on 
tangible property sales of $4.4 billion. The 
other 12,248 foreign subsidiaries of the 519 
U.S. parents experienced no adjustments to a 
total of $28.1 billion in intercorporate 
sales transRctions. (Seep. 42.) 
Neither GAO nor IRS knows how m~ch noncompliance 
exists, nor how many more adjustments IRS should 
have made. However, given the difficulty inher-
ent in administering section 482 through the cur-
rent Treasury regulations, the examiners' state-
ments, and the statistics on the adjustments 
IRS made, it can reasonably be concluded that 
the potential for greater enforcement exists. 
In the early 1970s, Trensury considered several 
regulation changes in response to criticism 
made at that time. The changes, however, were 
not implemented. Today the need is even greater 
for Treasury to consider revising the regulations 
than it was a decade ago. A 1981 study under-
taken at the joint request of IRS, Treasury, and 
the Department of Justice has also recommended re-
vising the regulations to reduce administrative 
burden and increase certainty, thus lending sup-
port to GAO's conclusions (p. 43.) 
Tax experts and corporate taxpayers have sug-
gested that Treasury reconsider the appropri-
ateness of the arm's length standard in an 
economic world more complex than that which 
existed when the standard was adopted in 1934. 
For example, one alternative suggested is to 
expand the use of the safe haven concept, thus 
creating greater certainty. Another alterna-
tive frequently suggested is the use of formu-
las for apportioning income in certain situa-
tions. Apportionment formulas are presently 
used by 45 States, and some experts believe 
these formulas, when applicable, reflect market 
realities better than the arm's length standard. 
{Sec pp. 50 to 52.) 
A major objection to the use of formula appor-
tionment across national borders is that tax 
treaties between the U.S. and other nations 
specify the arm's length standard for adjusting 
corporate income. For the U.S. to adopt a dif-
ferent method could result in multinational 
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corporatjons incurrjng dnubJc L1x-1tion. C/\0 
recognizes the s i<Jlli fi C<l nee of Lh is p:r obJ, 'm. 
(Seep. 52.) 
GAO suggests that IRS consider wuys to get a 
measure of noncompliance and that 'frei:l~>ury be 
the focal point for a study to identify ways to 
improve the guidance provided concerning section 
482 enforcement. After IRS and Treasnry have 
crn•pleted this work, Treasury should be able 
to make an informed decision as to whether and 
how to change the section 482 regulations. 
(Seep. 53.) 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSIONER 
---·-----
OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
IRS presently lacks sufficient information to 
assess the effectiveness of its section 482 en-
forcement and design future st ategy with in-
formed judgment. The need to ke informed 
strategy decisions will assume c en greater im-
portance in the future as the number of inter-
corporate transactions continues to grow in dis-
proportion to IRS' limited resources. To place 
the Service in a position to make informed deci-
sions regarding how best to deploy those resources, 
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue: 
--Aggregate and analyze existing data from a_ 
management perspective, consider ways to get 
a measure of noncompliance, and establish 
procedures for continuously assessing the ap-
propriateness of IRS' section 482 enforcelflent 
strategy. 
GAO also made other recommendations to improve 
IRS' enforcement activities (p. 25.) 
RECOMMENDATIONS •ro THE SECRETARY 
OF THE 'rREASURY 
'fhe current Treasury regulations for implement-
ing code section 482 create uncertainty and ad-
ministrative burden for both IRS and corporate 
taxpayers. Since better guidelines are needed, 
GAO recoMnends that the Secretary of the Treasury: 
-- Begin a study to identify and eva1 uate the 
feasibility of ways to allocat.e income unr1 {~r 
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S<'''ti()n IJ(;), :irwludin•J formul;c1 apportionment, 
whic:h would lesst'n thL' present uncertainty 
and administrative burden created by the ex-
isting regulations. 
GAO also recorrr~,ended that the Secretary: 
--Adjust the safe haven interest rate as fre-
quently as necessary to realistically reflect 
the current costs of borrowing on the open 
market. 
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS 
To provide IRS the authority to require the in-
formation it needs from foreign-controlled u.s. 
corporations, GAO recommended that the Congress 
amend section 6038 of the Internal Revenue Code 
to further provide that every United States 
person, as presently defined by the code, shall 
furnish such information as the Secretary may 
prescribe by regulation with respect to any 
foreign corporation which controls such person. 
AGENCY COf'.1MENTS AND GAO'. S EVALUATION 
Treasury agreed in principle with GAO's conclusions 
and recommendations concerning the need to more 
frequently adjust the safe haven interest rate. 
Treasury stated that a change in the current safe 
haven rate Wcts made on July 1, 1981, and it anti-
cipated that the rate in the future will be ~djusted 
periodically so as to reflect major changes in in-
tere~:;t costs. 
Both Treasury and IRS generally agreed with GAO's 
recommen(!ations concerning spf:cific improvements 
that need to be made to current section 482 en-
forcement procedures. However, both agencies ex-
pressed disagreement with the recommendation that 
Treasury undertake a study to identify ways to les-
sen the uncertainty and administrative burden cre-
ated by the existing regulations. In so doing, 
both a0nncics, GAO believes, minimized the serious-
ness of the difficulties which section 482 enforce-
ment has prescnte~ and continues to present all 
affected parties. As GAO noted, uncertainty as well 
as the administrative difficulties and burden on all 
parties affected by section 482 enforcement have 
been documented in a11 previous studies on the sub-
ject, tlv:· mo~;t recent being a January 1981 study 
undertaken ;~t the joint rt~·quest of t.he IRS Cornmis-
s i o:u:or, the A .s i sta nt Attorney Genera 1, and the As-
si_st;,nt Sf'•-'l<'tdry of t~H~ Tro:-1~-:ury for T.:>x Po] icy. 
(See pp. 54 to 57.) 
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CHAP'l'ER 3 
HOW CAN SECTION 482 ENFORCEMENT BE MADE 
MORE CERTAIN AND LESS ADf.HNISTRATIVELY 
BURDENSOME? TRE:ASURY SHOULD SEEK THE ANS~·IER 
Adjusting multinational intercorporate transactions for tax 
purposes under current section 482 regulations is administrative-
ly burdensome for both IRS and the corporate taxpayer. Moreover, 
the consioerable amount of judgment necessary in most income ad-
justments recommended under the regulations creates uncertainty. 
In recent years, the regulations ·have been a source of dissatis-
faction to all parties affected, including the courts. 
In essence, section 482 enforcement is criticized because 
the theory on which it rests no longer corresponds to the reali-
ties of intercorporate transactions. In theory, a section 482 
adjustment should be made when income reported for a multina-
tional intercorporate transaction vari,s from the comparable un-
controlled price of a similar transaction between two unrelated 
businesses. The comparable uncontrolled price is the arm's 
length price for the transaction. In practice, however, IRS 
examiners .have difficulty finding a comparable uncontrolled 
price for most transactions. Of the examinations we reviewed, 
only 3 percent {12 of 403) of IRS' recommended adjustments be-
tween parents and foreign subsidiaries were based on comparable 
uncontrolled prices. The income adjusted through these arm's 
length prices amounted to only 3 percent of the total income ad-
justed for section 482 issues. 
The regulations provide some guidance for those instances 
where an arm's length price cannot be identified but, too fre-
quently, the examiner must use considerable judgment in analyz-
ing extensive data which often does not directly relate to the 
specific situation at hand. To the extent that the facts do not 
directly relate, the adjustment price becomes estimated. 
Tax experts and corporate taxpayers have suggested that 
Treasury reconsider the appropriateness of the arm's length 
standard in an economic world more complex than that which 
existed when the standard was adopted in 1934. For example, one 
alternative suggested is the use of formulas for apportioning 
income in certain situations. Apportionment formulas are pres-
ently used by the States, and some experts believe these formu-
las, when applicable, reflect market realities better than the 
arm's length standard. Another alternative frequently suggested 
is to expand the use of the safe haven concept, thus, creating 
greater certainty. 
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\·J•? ~-,,, • '3'' i /'.(' i 11,-,1 :,c,rHc- rli ffi(·11lt ini <:'rn,·,t ion<>l 1 ~;,-,;;es 
.• i,Jllt ]l,~ ,.li· .• ·d if 11H~ ll.S. dd<>Jd.r·d J;r;w <lpprn<~crl•~s to t.,xing 
,,,;]i ir:.d inn.ll t f·<rl: .. ,c·l ions. Vie, rlo not, llo·,:~_:·v•er, '!-lelicvc! lh;lt. 
L11is p!·uc;pc·~:t s1luu1d dt•! ·~r Treasury from stw1ying whether al-
t<:rnativcs, or a t-::<·i;ibin<'ition of alternative and present ap-
proilchcs, could make section 482 enforcement adrninist.rat.ively 
easier, more <crtain, and more equitable for all concerned. 
I HS l"'LAKES l:\EL/I.Tl VEIN FEW 
ADJUST!•1ENTS ON THE BASIS OF 
~------'-··~---- ·----~- --·-------~-------
COMPARABLE INDEPENDENT PRICES 
The 1968 regulations issued by Treasury provided IRS with 
guidelines for rnaking section 482 income adjustment.s. The regu-
lations explain the arm's length standard, the principle under-
lying section 482 adjustments, as follows: 
"The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled 
taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, 
by determining, according to the standard of an uncon-
trolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the prop-
erty and business of a controlled taxpayer * * *· The 
standard to be applied in every case is that of an un-
controlled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another 
uncontrolled taxpayer." 
For example, uncontrolled transactions with respect to the trans-
fer of tangible property are defined as 
--sales by an member of the controlled group to unrelated 
businesses, 
--sales to a member of the controlled group by unrelated 
businesses, and 
-~sales in which the businesses are not members of the 
controlled group and are not related to each other. 
IRS first tries to identify independent transactions which 
are exactly comparable or so nearly identical to the transac-
tion in question as to have no effect on price. In the absence 
of such independent transactions, the regulations permit IRS to 
use other alternative techniques to apply the arm's length stand-
ard. The alternative techniques generally involve constructing 
adjustment prices based on independent transactions that fall 
short of being exactly comparable or nearly identical to the 
transaction in question. The regulations provide guidelines for 
making adjustments to the following five categories of intercor-
porate transactions: {1) sale of tangible property, (2) transfer 
or use of int.angible property, (3) loans and advances, (4) per-
formance of services, and (5) use of tangible property (rent). 
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The regulat.ions permit the use of a 1 terna t i vc technique's for a<-'1-
justments in all five categories of transactions when a compar-
able uncontrolled price cannot be found. The regulations also 
require the use of safe haven rules under certain conditions for 
transactions in categories ( 3) 1 ( 4) 1 ( 5). 
Our study showed that few section 482 adjustments are made 
using prices based on comparable uncontrolled transactions. As 
shown in the following table only 3 percent of the 403 IRS recom-
mended section 482 adjustments were based on arm's length prices 
det.e nnined through cot:1parab le uncontrolled transactions. The 403 
adjustments involved 200 of the 519 multinational corporations in 
our data base and their controlled foreign corporations. !/ 
Basis ~or ad ustment 
4roounts determined through 
Comparable uncontrolled 
transactions 
Alternative techniques 
Safe haven rules 
Total 
Other: 
Not determinable from 
report (note a) 
Not applicable (note b} 
Total 
Number of 
adjustments 
12 
107 
240 
359 
25 
19 
403 
Adjusted 
Percent amount 
3 $ 7,384,342 
26 181,2511869 
60 -6 0_,_:1- l 0 _0.__§_9_ 
89 249,0461980 
---"--~-----·---
6 71592,307 
5 20,855,126 
----·--·--·--~-- --
100 
~/Information not shown in records we examined. 
Percent 
3 
65 
22 
90 
3 
7 
100 --
b/Use of section 482 to make adjustments where neither safe haven 
-rules nor arm's length prices were applicable. For example, re-
turning total income to the U.S. because of sham foreign subsid-
iary. 
As shown above, 26 percent of the section 482 adjustments 
were made using alternative techniques. These require an even 
greater degree of subjective judgment by the examiner than does 
1/IRS also made other section 482 adjustments amounting to $330 
million which involved 235 of the 519 corporations. We.~ did 
nol analyze these adjustments because the:, transactions did not 
involve a controlled foreign corporation. However, 200 of the 
235 corporations are the sa.me corporation~~ repre~;ented in our 
str-J.tistics because they also had adjustt,l~?nts involving their 
foreign subsidiaries. 
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i]Jr~ id.·ni ifi,:.-,1 i<.n 1;[ on <!llll 1 S lt.•J1•jth pr:i.<::e. The inco:ne .:id·-
j•;:,L• d t.1uc \ Jh .Jl! •·1 :1 • .! ive 1 ec1·:niqucs <CiP•.~\:rd ed to 65 percent 
of I }I{~ I i:d. ,.[(ljlJ:; I rl. TLe tax lltlpact of i hcsc .).djustrnents is 
not kh)\vn pr•'ci c:ly but can be rou(3hly est :imat.ed at $87 million 
b.3.sed on a corporate tax rate of 48 percent. 
In the next f~w pages we describe in greater detail the 
kinds of alterniiUve techniques aviiilable to IRS examiners in 
r:H1justing incoHte for the five cn.te<Jories of intercorporate trans-
actions. Our discussion shows that the application ·of alterna-
tive techniques where no comparable uncontrolled price can be 
found creates administrative difficulties and uncertainty for 
both IRS and the corporate taxpayer. In most cases, the adjust-
Jnent that results from applying th~ alternative techniques is 
based on data that does not directly relate to the specific sit-
uation at hand. 
!"!~st ad ust._:nents _in'v'_~l_'v'_i~<;t 
_t.he_~(:l--~---of_ t_?_ng_~b.l_~ y_r_c::peE!:_Y 
involve cons id_~r a ~~_c::__juc_!9rl_le.l2!: 
IRS considers tangible property adjustments to be the most 
important of the five categories discussed in the regulations 
because the largest amounts of revenue are involved. Tangible 
property adjustments in our data base amounted to 45 percent 
($125.1 of $277.5 million) of the total income adjusted by IRS 
under section 482. 
Wnen a comparable uncontrolled price for a tangible prop-
erty adjustment cannot be identified, the regulations direct ex-
aminers to apply the resale price method, then the cost plus 
method, and finally a fourth method defined as "some appropriate 
method." (See app. III for a description of these pr ing meth-
ods). These methods must be applied in sequence until an appro-
priate basis for an adjustment is found. 
Our statistics show that IRS was able to identify prices 
established through comparable uncontrolled transactions in only 
15 percent (5 of 34) of its tangible property adjustments. Even 
rnore revealing is that the adjustment amounts based on comparable 
uncontrolled transactions represented only about 2 percent ($2.3 
of $124.2 million) of the tangible property income which was ad-
justed by IRS through determinable methods. 
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Prici method 
Adjuslmcnts 
Nur,\ber Percent 
A!ctUU tl t 
Total 
-- -~ 
Percenl 
Comparable uncontrolled 
transactions 5 15 $ 2,347,236 2 
Resale price method 4 12 7,801,901 6 
Cost-plus method 9 26 7,229,240 6 
Any other method 16 47 106,796,497 86 
Total 34 100 --
Not determinable 3 964,019 
'Total 37 125 -
Information in the reports IRS provided us was not suffi-
cient to determine the pricing method used for 3 of the 37 
adjustments. However, only 5 of the remaining 34 adjustments 
were made using prices obtained from comparable uncontrolled 
transactions. When comparable uncontrolled transactions could 
not be identified, IRS examiners most often used the fourth or 
"any other" method. Thus, 86 percent f the income adjustments 
resulting from the sale of tangible prc~erty were made using 
that method for which the regulations provide the least guid-
ance. 
The following examples taken from reports prepared by IRS 
economists and international examiners on examination cases we 
reviewed illustrate the amount of work and the considerable de-
gree of judgment required of an examiner. 
Co A, a U.S. parent, sold component parts and 
rna er a s o its foreign subsidiaries. The foreign sub-
sidiaries assembled finished or semifinished devices that 
they sold back to the u.s. parent. The economist could not 
identify comparable uncor1trolled transactions within the 
controlled group because the U.S. parent and the foreign 
subsidiaries made no similar sales to unrelated parties. 
Also, the economist was unable to find comparable uncon-
trolled transactions outside the controlled group because 
the multinational corporation's interaffiliate transactions 
were in a form contrary to normal trade practices. The 
economist found that normal trade practices in that indus-
try would have the U.S. parent providing without charye the 
component parts and materials to the foreign subsidiaries 
which, in turn, would function as contract assemblers and 
be paid for the services provided. The econor:1ist developed 
an adjustment based on an analysis of what would be an ap-
propciate amount (labor costs plus profit) to reiniliurse the 
foreign subsidi.<7ries for assembling the t~·r,y; sold to the 
U.S. parent corpordtion. The econor,ic>t, in corc•putin9 the 
adjuo;tit'•~nts, used profit nk1rg.Ln pE:~rc~::nt<'lfJ s obtained frCJ[[l 
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;,n i ;,t),.l"'r'·1·--nt ,:c,r!1J-;1,'t ao,:;r-;,\bl c:r 1-_11.1t p•,rfon,,ed wor·k sone--
',•!Il·ii: j;,d_l;tr to th.-it <lone by t~he focr:ign :;\1bs1<'U ries. The 
<·conomi st ul..:·d i haL the infor;n;-it L)n obLaincd (rom the in-
,1 epen,1en t ':oni~ r <1 c i: assembler was i ncompl et e and irncompa t i 1' le 
in s ev.::ral impor·t ant a rea s. 
Corporation B, a U.S. parent, sold chemicals to a foreign 
conEr=-offe_d_dTstributor corporation at a markup of 10 per-
cent over mAnufacturing costs. The examiner could not 
identify comparable uncontrolled transactions within the 
controlled group because no similar sales were made to un-
related parties. The examiner developed the adjustment 
b2sed on the yross profit percentages that selected inde-
penr1ent (t~hird party) U.S. distrihut_ors earned selling the 
U.S. parent corporat~ion' s chemicals. Ho•.-Jever, the examiner 
adjusted the independent U.S. distributors' profit percent-
age using three factors to compensate for differences in 
the operations of the independent distributors and the for-
eign controlled distributor. The examiner made the adjust-
ments based on a gross margin of 36.3 percent computed as 
follows: 
Factors 
u.s. distributors' gross margin 
Differences in 
Sales function 
Warehousing function 
Markets 
Total 
Gross profit 
percentage 
27.7 
4.1 
0.5 
4.0 
36.3 
' The ex ner identified the differences in operations after 
considerable discussion with representatives of the corpo-
ration. Because the foreign-controlled distributor was 
located in a tax haven country, it was to the u.s. parent 
corporation's benefit to have its foreign distributor's 
gross profit percentage as high as possible. Therefore, 
the U.S. corporation officials argued that the different 
factor percentages should be higher. The examiner stated 
in his report that the adjustment made could not be tied 
down to a realistic, factual situation. 
As shown below, the results of our analysis of IRS adjust-
ments to sales of tangible property are not dramatically d.iffer-
ent from those of other studies: 
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Percent of acl LlStTl1C'tltS usi.n yr_ic·i rnc· t_·h ()Cl 
Aiterna t-:(ve met.hoc1 s 
Year of Comparable -\ 
St:_udy study uncontrolled Resale Plus Other Total Total ------- --- ~----- ----~ 
Conference 
Board 
(note a) 1972 28 13 23 36 72 100 
Department of 
Treasury 
(note b) 1973 21 11 27 41 79 100 
Indiana 
University 
(note c) 1980 24 14 30 32 76 100 
a/Michael G. Duerr, Tax Allocations and International Business: 
-- Co _r p_~F ate _E: xp~ r i_~~c e ______ e_::;_: _____ ~----------- n _e_r__r_~~l ____________________ _ 
Code, (New York: The Conference Board, l972l. The n erence 
Board is an independent, nonprofit business research organiza-
tion. 
c/Jane 0. Burns, "How IRS Applies the Intercompany Pricing Rules 
-of Section 482: A Corporate Survey," Journal of Taxation, 54 
(May 1980), 308-14. Dr. Burns, presen 
of Business, Indiana University, is a former Vice-President of 
the American Taxation Association and Treasurer of the American 
Accounting Association's International Accounting Section. 
Intangible property includes such things as patents, inven-
tions, trademarks, brand names, and technical data. (See app. 
IV.) Ownership of valuable intangible property can provide a 
corporation with a corapetitive advantage and re'.vards which en-
able above normal profits. 
Similar to adjustments involving tangible property pricing, 
intangible prop~rty adjust.rnents were based on comparable un-
controJ led transact ions. IRS recorpmendcc1 73 inta.ngib1 e property 
adjus nts between U.S. parent corpordtions anc] thr~j r for·E·ign 
subs id ii1 ries in the exa.mina t ions we rcvievl(:cl. Ide could not de 
te rn ne the method used in making 18 of the adjustments becaus0 
the ex<-t'niner's report did not contain sufficient inforrnati_on. 
How~'ver, only 3 of the remaining 55 adjustmc:1ts (5 percent) were~ 
secl on pricc·s obtained from ccw1pctrable uncontroller1 trctn~;ac 
tions. The 3 ac1justmr:nt.s repr<:::r;entecl about 4 pcccE:nt ( $2.3 of 
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~;61.1 I>~ilJiun) uf t)d::' ~·Aal iOUnt ~H3jnsb:d for irtL:n•Jjbl~C ~n_up-­
etly. The L''L.li;d:!<J 52 adjtJSlJ.:cnts Wt?te li~<'HJe Ly the ( ;:·dncr 
usin<:J an alle::rnat:ivc iJ'chnique. t.Yhen a compa1:.able unc(,ntr:ollt.d 
p r i c e c a n no t b c f c 11 n d for ,:;. n ad j u s t r:1 c n t i n v o l v j n g i n t a i 1 'J i b 1 e 
property, the Jt''<jlJlations give the exandner 12 factors to con-
sider in makiny the t:tdjustmc:nt. The use of lhc::;e fuctors l·c-
q u i t c· :::; t h a t t he e x ,, n: i n e r c u n s t r u c t t h c ad j u s L me n t p r i c e • N u r-
mally, bo·.;~c"ver, an <.cxami ner does not have to use all 12 factors 
before arriving at a basis for the adjustment. 
The following example illustrates how a price is constructed 
by an IRS economist or an international exa1niner when prices from 
COlllpdrable uncontrollc:d tr.:-msactions are not available. 
Corporation A, a foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiary, paid 
·a t:oy-aTty · r-afe of 9 percent on sales of a drug its fondgn 
parent corporation licensed it to manufacture and sell. 
The examiner could not identify comparable uncontrolled 
transactions to use in making the adjustment because the 
foreign parent corporation did not have similar licensing 
ugreen1en ts for the drug with unrelated parties. The ex ami-
ner developed an adjustment that recognized a 5 instead of 
a 9 percent rate based on his findings that the drug was 
. "second line" rather than "unique and superior" as clai111ed 
by the u.s. corporation. The examiner attributed the drug's 
extremely high sales to sensational advertising and unparal-
leled promotion by the u.s. corporation. The examiner con-
structed the 5 percent royalty rate based on the following 
information. 
a. Discussion with personnel who negotiated the royalty 
rates indicated that over the years the 5 percent 
rate had become acceptable to both parties. 
b. For many years a rate of return of 5 percent on a 
financial investment was considered good in the cor-
porate sector. This factor was one of the main con-
siderations in arriving at a rate acceptable to both 
parties. 
c. There had been other studies of drug royalty rates 
which indicated that the most common rate charged 
was 5 percent. 
As a 1979 report by the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development pointed out, 1/ it is difficult to identify 
comparable uncontrolled transactions since the owner of intangible 
1/TrcnsferPricing In Multinational ~~-t!:'~.I2-~J?~~ (Paris: O:r:gani-
za t on-- for -Ec-or)-c)rn:Cc-·e:o-opera tTon- and De: velopr~.en t I. 19 7 9) • 
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prop rty, particularly t.hc Oi!.fn,~:r of a paten:_, i~; e~;~;r·nticilly the 
owner of a monopoly right which may not be rnc•r1c available to un-
related businesses. 
The method most frequently used to make section 482 adjust-
ments in the examinations we reviewed involved the safe haven 
rules. (See app. I.) Safe haven rules must be used by examiners 
to determine adjustment prices or rates only when the corpora-
tion makes loans and advances, provides a service, or rents tan-
gible property to its foreign subsidiaries, and then only if the 
corporation does not routinely engage in these types of transac-
tions with other parties. If the corporation is in the business 
of making loans and advances, providing similar services or rent-
ing similar property to unrelated businesses, the examiner can-
not use the safe haven rules and mu ~ try to obtain a price from 
a comparable uncontrolled transactioL. When safe haven rules 
can be used, the examiner does not lc~k for a comparable uncon-
trolled price but immediately refers to the safe haven rules. 
The regulations, however, allow a corporation to contest an ad-
justment made by the safe haven rules. If a corporation can sup-
port an ~rm's length price for the transaction, IRS must accept 
the arm's length price rather than one arrived at using the safe 
haven rules. ' 
Of the 274 adjustments in our data base involving loans and 
advances, services, and rents, 240 adjustments (87 percent) were 
made using the safe haven rules. The amount adjusted using the 
safe haven rules represented 86 percent ($60.4 of $70.3 million) 
of the total amount of income adjusted by IRS for these thre 
ca tE:gories of transactions. (See app. V.) 
IRS could not use the safe haven rules to determine the 
adjustment price for the remaining 34 adjustments because the 
nature of the transaction being adjusted represented an integral 
part of the corporation's business. The amount adjusted in such 
instances must be based on an arm's length pr e. However, simi-
lar to adjustments involving tangible and intangible property 
pri ing, few of these 34 adjustment_s were made based on prices 
obta ned from comparahle uncontrolled transactions. Information 
in the reports we reviewed was not sufficien to dele ne if 
rable uncontrolled prices were used for 4 of the 34 adjust-
ments. However, only 4 of the remaining 30 adjustments were 
based on comparable uncontrolled prices. The four adjustments 
represented only 28 percent ($2.7 of $9.8 million) of the total 
income adjusted for these three ca ries of transactions using 
techniques other than safe havens. 
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'i'il•! ,~ '_;lll ,1 j, !:~> rlo ;,•)t l_H:uvi•1,; ;1y <Jlli<1<Jnce i~o ,~:·:, <1inf:>rs 
fcjf: tlt:II·C,;itd!,'J lhe lJtice to U C for 1Udr1S Clnd (1(]Va 1:C'S 1 e>c•r--
vi r:•~s, nd c nLs ·~~11cn co;..p;yc,,blc: unc<~•ntrolled tr:i'lnsactions c. n--
not be i<1 !li:ifiJ•c'l nd sr1fe ha~ven rules cannot be applied. Of 
the 30 ddjusU:l<:>nts ::~.:H1e by det~erminable t~echniques oUH:;r i:han 
the safe haven rules, 28 involved service category transactions 
between U.S. p'lr nts and foreign subsidiaries. Prices for only 
three of th<'~Se 28 ;v] jusLmL:nt.s were hased on cornparable uncon-
t:coll,?d t:c<1.nsactions. Thus, the remaining 25 service category 
transactions we reviewed were adjusted solely on the basis of 
examiner discretion. Income adjusted for the 25 transactions 
an,ount.c,d to $6.8 ;ui) lion. 
PCYC":NT rl\.L l\D,JUS'l''"H:NTS 1v1AY BE f\H~;::;go 
L~ i:.i JJt: R ClJ R R r:N;f·-· S i::C~'r JJ)N , __ 4.~8 2 R El-; u-LA-ft-6NS 
The administrative complexity produced by the current 
section 482 regulations may result in potential adjustments 
not being made. 'rhc regulations prescribe a complex and time-
consuming process for making adjustments. First, the examiner 
must identify questionable transactions. If safe haven rules 
do not apply, the examiner must perform a functional analysis 
of the transactions, search for comparable uncontrolled prices 
(which our analysis indicates are rarely obtainable), and then 
construct comparable uncontrolled prices using judgment to the 
degree needed. Because examiners work on several cases simul-
taneously, precise data on the average time required for a sec-
tion 482 adjustment is lacking. However, our interviews with 
IRS examiners and the statistics we developed indicate that IRS' 
limited number of examiners are unable to cover the universe of 
multinational intercorporate transactions. Thus, given the cbm-
plexity of the current regulations and IRS' limited resources 
with which to implement them, there is a need for revised guide-
lines which could be more easily administered and which would 
bring greater certainty and less burden to section 482 enforce-
ment. 
To enforce section 482 under the arm's length standard, IRS 
must ex mine in aetai 1 the particulars of intercorporate transac-
tions. Because of the large number involved, IRS cannot pcssibly 
do this for all transactions between corporations and related for-
eign subsidiaries. For example, the 519 multinational corpora-
tions in our data base generated $32 billion in sales with about 
12,000 foreign subsidiaries. Thus, the first step of IRS' en-
forcement process is the decision as to which transactions are 
to be reviewed in (1et:ail during the examination. 
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The LHS nFlnue::l provides sor,;c gu ic'1 Ct? to CXd:'rin r::~ for· ir1en · 
tifying questionable transactions between U.S. corporations and 
related foreign corporations which may warrant detailed analysis. 
part of this guidance is in a section entitled "Pointers to In-
ternational Tax Avoidance" which contains several indicat.ors of 
the possible existence of non-arm's length dealings. (See app. 
VI.) For exan~le, two of the indicators are: 
--Controlled foreign subsidiaries located in tax haven 
countries. A tax haven country is any country whose laws 
provide an escape from taxes on incor;:re which would other-
wise be taxed in another country. 
--Consolidated worldwide profits are higher than U.S. 
profits. This type of situation can be an indication that 
profits of the U.S. corporations are being diverted to a 
tax haven country. 
Information needed for applyin,_' these pointers is obtained 
from the multinational corporation's tax return and supporting 
books and recoids. The identificati of questionable trans-
actions from these pointers is often more difficult than the 
equivalent process for many other code sections, because there 
is no account or amount shown on the tax return to indicate 
whether _section 482 should become an issue. Therefore, the ex-
aminer must resort to the guidelines described above to identify 
transactions which may not be in compliance with the arm's length 
standard. 
Once questionable transactions have been identified, exam-
iners must begin the process of determining if an adjustment is 
needed and, if so, the amount_. Where safe haven rules cannot be 
applied, examiners must obtain detailed information concerning 
the transactions in question. To determine whether the inter-
corporate transactions were priced at arm's length, examiners 
must usually perform a functional analysis. A functional analy-
sis involves a probe into exactly what the pc1rent and its subsid-
iary actually did in relation to the income ectrnec1. A functionc1l 
analysis is required because IRS believes that facts reg rding 
comparctble trC:tnsactions must be ana.lyzec'l to determine with ac 
curacy just. what should be measured. 
According to IRS' manual, a functionctl analysis is bctsPd on 
the economic princ le that. in a business enteqn·ise, or a group 
of enterprises, each function should earn its fctir share of any 
resulting profits. When various functions are perforrncrJ, th<::: 
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;-•11' ,-in i ·:Q i h.d~ p1·· .vi ·l•!S •:,nsi~ of the c· !fort., dn<'l/oc t:hc r·.ll··-~ or 
•:i'li'l<le CtllJ<'t ·iol;~:;, ;1)t)1lld •:r~rn ;.,n•;t of the pr-ofit. IRS;,,.,;-, .lJ-•::s 
the ,-,,L:lt i\IC i.·L•od.,ncc of c ch funci'_ion throucJh functirJn.>l -inal--
ysis. The lHS n~Hl'Fll requires the cxi1Fliner to obtain suffici1,nt 
< 1 a t a to an !3 w f' r q u c s t j on s s u c h a s : 'i'\Th at w a s c1 one ? hTh a t s i '] n i_ f i -
cant functions were involved in doing it? Who performed each 
function, and what was the economic value of each function per-
fanned by each party? The manual specifies t.hat normally the 
functional analysis begins with t_he organization which initi;lted 
the transaction and carries through until the transaction gen-
erated income from outside the controlled group. 
To illustrate, if a parent sells goods to its foreign sub-
sidi<try, it is not enough in most instances to iietermine what 
price t.he co1~pora.t. ion paid, the terms of payment, etc. In addi-
t.ion, the exorniner must determine what the corporation did with 
the goods. For exan~le, if the goods were resold by the foreign 
subsidiary, the monual states that the examiner should determine: 
a. Whether the corporation had a sales staff. If so, the 
examiner should determine how many and their compensation. 
b. Whether it was necessary to provide technical assistance 
to the foreign purchaser. If so, the examiner should 
determine who did it (the foreign corporation or the 
parent) and the kind of technical assistance provided. 
c. Whether the foreign corporation warehoused the goods or 
extended credit to its customers. If so, the examiner 
should determine the amount of capital needed to perform 
this function and/or the extent of bad debt experi~nce. 
IRS suggests that examiners prepare a checklist to document 
the results of the functional analysis. To prepare the checklist, 
examiners must list all the significant functions performed and 
then indicate who performed them, the U.S. corporation or the 
foreign subsidiary. (See app. VII for an example of a functional 
checklist.) 
Once the significant functions and who performed them have 
been identified, the functions themselves must be analyzed. This 
analysis requires that examiners obtain other information to an-
swer questions such as: Could anyone else perform the functjons? 
How difficult are they? What skills are required? What equip-
ment is used? According to IRS, it is critical that examiners 
focus on the relative importance of each function in terms of 
contribution to the total profit picture. Thus, a functional 
analysis requires data which may take considerable time to ob-
tain and an analysis which will take still more time. 
Once an ex<rniner has conpleted a functional analysis, the 
nc~xt step is to search for a comparable uncontrolled price. The 
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I [:::. 5 rr.-, n u a l r e qui_ res t h c e x et rd rL_:: r to b c 'J in by i n v c: ~' t j 'J,, t in] t h c 
validity of the method used by the cor.-poraLior. in ar.-rivintj at the 
price it used. For example, if the commission charged to a for-
eign corporation was based on commissions charged to independent 
parties, the independent transactions should be examined to de-
tc r.ninc if the cornmi ss ion can be used as a conn a ra':J le. w"hen a 
compardble price cannot be found from within the corporation's 
own controlled group the examiner must look to third party data. 
This step would require obtaining appropriate information from 
government sources, industrial organizations, investment services, 
and the private business sector. 
Regardless of where comparables are obtained, the examinee 
must develop sufficient information concerning them to show that 
the transactions used are in fact comparable. This requires de-
tails concerning the terms at which the comparable transactions 
were handled and the circumstances surrounding the transactions, 
including a comparison between (l) functions performed by each 
party involved in the comparable transaction and (2) functions 
performed by the parent and foreign ubsidiary in the questioned 
transaction. 
IRS considers third party transactions comparable to the 
controlled transactions if the property and circumstances in the 
uncontrolled transactions are identical to those in the controlled 
transaction; or if they are so nearly identical that they have no 
effect on price or can be reflected by a reasonable number of ad-
justments to the uncontrolled sales. IRS also instructs its ex-
aminers that in some cases a single "best" com[larable may not be 
found. Instead, there may be several independent transactions 
each of which differs from the questionable transaction in some 
significant way . However, considered together, the several in-
dependent transactions may be used to determine an arm's length 
price for the questionable transaction within a usable narrow 
range. 
The IRS examination reports we reviewed provided some in-
sight into the difficult and time-consuming work involved in 
performing a functional analysis and in analyzing arm's length 
transactions to determine adjustment amounts. The key aspects 
of a functional analysis and the development of a transfer price 
by an IRS economist can be illustrated by the follmving exr::nnple. 
ration A, a U.S. parent, bought electronic item~ from 
-,-------'"---:::- --
ore gn subsidiary. The IRS economist, as part of the 
functional analysis, researched the manufacturing process 
for the electronic products and found that it consisted of 
(l) silicon manufacturing which involved processin<J of high 
purity silicon into slice fon.-,, (2) front end manufacturing 
which involved processin<J the slices to active elern;:'nts with 
e l e c t ron i c fun c t ions b u i l t i n , a n d ( 3 ) a s s c:: mb l i n g a n rJ t e s t-
ing which invo 1 ved as scL:'n l i tHJ b;c., r s or chip::; in to pet(~kr' 9e ::J 
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t ,.;, ·ll '],,,,,,,·j,·r·i·;l ir'~;. /\(('i_,~.·,Ji.ncj <J tl1e •:r:r)rJ<J,.ti.•;t's :t:t'·i>urt, 
!11·~ Li r •.;t_ 1.::0 hit;h -t<:c1Jrl<Jl•)(JY prlrLs \:/C'L-C f)(Tfonn.~d by the 
1 J. ~ 1 . p , u n 1- • r i \'<' ,, s i n t 1v~ ;, ~:; c: 1; 1 b 1 i n q '' n d h.: s t i lVJ t h a t t h e 
f"<.rei<.Ji1 ~;uh:;idi.lJY ni.:n:-d the mrtnufilcturing process. 'l'he 
functions performed by t_he foreign subsidiary inclu.ded 
--scribing the complete silicon slice, 
--breaking the sliCe into chips, 
--assembling good chips into finished devices with 
heac1ers, 1 c~.1d fra.1nes, bonding material, lead wires, 
mol rling C<!lnponents and, 
--testing finished devices and packaging. 
On the basis of information developed through this analysis 
of the m<lnufC~cturing process, the economist concluded that 
the foreign subsidiary should have been compensated for only 
assembly and test services. The economist then developed 
transfer prices for electronic items based on an analysis 
of what would be an L:lppropriate amount (labor costs plus 
profit) to reimburse t.he foreign subsidiary for assembling 
and testing the items for the U.S. parent. The economist 
interviewed 10 independent contract assemblers (with facil-
ities in foreign countries) to determine (1) the trade 
practices which prevailed when these cont_ractors dealt 
with U.S. companies, and (2) the net profit margin which 
these contractors earned. The economist decided that the 
independent contract assemblers were functionally compar-
~ble to the foreign subsidiary's operation and that the · 
independent net profit margins ranged from near zero to 
over 20 percent. Factors affecting the profit margins in-
cluded the market conditions and the mix of simple and com-
plex devices. One independent contract assembler provided 
the economist with its gross profit margin for 1 year for 
six major product categories and its income statement data. 
T1le C'Conornist converted the gross margin on sales percent-
ages to net margin on cost percentages which then became the 
comparable profit rates used to compute the section 482 ad-
justment. 
Some ad ust~ents may not be made 
e enfo1:ce:re-nt·----- ---
ve 
In talking with examiners in the seven IRS districts we vis-
itPd, we learned that they believe that some potential section 
~~~i:2 ,J.<Jj;_)~: ments are not being r'level Oi;.;ecL Exar:.ir:ers in three dis-
tric:ts attributed this sii~uation to bot-h the difficulties in the 
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._:o:i.tC)t'cc:·:ct·:nt procc~;s and the; tirtl(~ it t.'l}-:,:·,~; t.o dn the w::n~}:.. 
'l"hey ste1ted that some examiners give higher priocity to oUt·.r 
international tax issues, such as foreign tax credits, because 
it is less difficult and less time-consuming to identify the ad-
dition::tl tax. They added that section 482 work is a "high risk 
vent.ure" where much audit work can result in little additional 
tax. They pointed out that because of this, sonv:: ex::1mincrs hes-· 
itate to "go out on a limb" in attempting to deve:•lop an adju~3t­
ment and focus only on cases of flagrant abuse. The examiners 
indicated that a section 482 adjustment might not be attempted 
because of the difficulty involved in reaching agreement on an 
arm's length price or on the basis for making the adjustment. 
IRS was unable to provide us with data on the average 
length of time required to identify and develop a section 482 
adjustment. One reason for this is that examiners work other 
international tax issues at the same time they are developing 
section 482 adjustments and sometimes work on several examina-
tions simultaneously. Examiners also pointed out that the time 
needed to develop an adjustment can v~-y greatly depending on 
the type of adjustment being developed, the pricing method which 
must be used, and the cooperation of co.porate officials. 
A few examiners explained why the enforcement process takes 
so long. The primary reasons, according to the examiners, are 
that it tak~s time to study the corporation and/or its industry 
to become sufficiently knowledgeable to perform a functional 
analysis and to analyze comparable transactions, and that it 
takes time to obtain the substantial data and records that are 
needed from the corporation and other sources. These examiners 
also told us some of their experiences which can provide some 
insight into why the enforcement process is lengthy. 
--Two examiners stated that to make an adjustment an ex mi-
ner should (l) review the taxpayer's return including 
pertinent schedules, (2) review form 2952 for intercorpo-
rate pricing, ( 3) review prior IRS reports for section 
482 adjustments (4) visit the library to study activities 
of the corporation through news articles, shareholder re-
ports, etc., and (5) analyze the corporations' ability 
to make money by comparing profits to assets, payroll, 
sales, etc. 
---One exarainer said that if the corpora.tion is not coopera-
tive or does not have an adequ2te rccordkceping system, 
it could take over l year for the examiner to obtain suf-
ficient info~mation to determine whether an adjustment 
should be made. 
--Another examiner said that obtaining a.cccss to corporate 
record~; to develop ac1justwents is a difficult ta~.;k. He 
explained that questions on internation::l tax issues arc: 
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i I~S r:x<t'''i !H•rs }v,ve a 1 so st-_;:.t.ed that they are unable to cover 
t1•e universe of potential adjustments. During interviews in 1977 
with Bnuse Co,,•ni tt_ee on ';.<Jays and !•1eans Oversight Subcommi t.tr:;e 
staff, IRS examiners said that when they are faced with numerous 
records of tran::;actions, they generally rely on either a sconning 
of the records or the examination of a few of the largest <iollar 
transactions over a 1- or 2-month period. It is obvious that 
with such techniques only a few transactions can be examined and 
that if transactions are not examined, potential adjustments can-
not be identified. 
Our statistics can be interpreted to lend credence to the 
ex;1m:i.n.~rs' coinmc>nts. For example: 
--Only 200 of the 519 multinational corporations in our 
data base had section 482 adjustments involving their 
foreign subsidiaries. 
--The total profit (before taxes) of the corporations ex-
amined was $43,513.8 million. However, the adjustments 
amounted to only $277.5 million, a relatively small impact 
on corporate profit. The adjustments increased the profit 
of U.S. parents by 0.9 percent ($277.5 of $31,798.0 mil-
lion) and reduced the profit of foreign subsidiaries by 
2.4 percent ($277.5 of $11,715.8 million). 
--The bulk of the total $277.5 million was concentrated in 
only a few of the 403 total adjustments. Eleven of the 
403 adjustments accounted for over one-half of the $277.5 
million. 
--Adjustments involving the sale of tangible property, the 
category of intercorporate transaction where the largest 
amounts of revenue are at issue, were also concentrated. 
~hirty-five u.s. parents and 89 of their foreign subsidi-
aries experienced adjustments on tangible property sales 
of $4.4 billion. The other 12,248 foreign subsidiaries 
of the 519 U.S. parents experienced no adjustments to a 
total of $28.1 billion in intercorporate sa1es transac-
tions. 
Neither we nor IRS know how much noncompliance exists, nor 
how many more adjustments IRS should have made. Hov:ever, given 
the difficulty inherent in administering sectisn 482 through the 
current Treasury r<::gulat.ions, the ex,::::ni:,c:rs' st:1terc-:ents, and the 
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s t '' t i s t :L c s on the ad j u s t:. r 1 __, n t ~; I RS w · (1 c , we t r1 i n 1: i t r c '': " ! ' , 1 e 
to conclude that the pot:ential for g:t-eater enfo c,'; nt exi~;L::;. 
The difficulty in making section 482 adjustments and the im-
pact this difficulty has on enforcement was recognized as early 
as 1962 in a House report. 1/ The report stated that, in prac-
tice, the difficulty in determining a fair price un~er this code 
provision severely limits the usefulness of its power, especially 
when there are thousands of different transactions between a do-
mestic corporation and its foreign subsidiaries. 
A recent report documents the fact that section 482 ad-
justments continue to be a problem for all concerned. The 
study, dated January 12, 1981 and written by Richard Gordon, 
Special Counselor, International Taxation, was undertaken in 
response to a joint request by the Acting Commissioner of IRS, 
the Assistant Attorney Genera , and the Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury for Tax Policy, and in response to congressional 
pressure upon IRS to take significant action against tax haven 
abuses. 2/ The study concluded that se~tion 482 is one of the 
most important tools available to IRS ~or dealing with tax ha-
ven tax haven transactions but found that both IRS and taxpayers 
have had difficulties with the current section 482 regulations. 
The study recommended that the regulations be amended so as to 
ease some of the administrative burden placed on both taxpayers 
and the IRS and to achieve greater certainty in pricing inter-
national transactions. 
CORPORATIONS, COURTS, TAX EXPERTS 
AND IRS OFFICIALS HAVE CRITI IZEO 
Tt-fF: --sECT ION 482--l::fEGULATfo~ 
Representat'ives of all groups affect.ec1 by an<'l knowledr]'::~at)le 
about section 482 enforcement under the arm's length standard 
have voiced continuous and substantive criticisr11 of the regu-· 
lations. The criticisms focus on the fact that section 482 
enforcement creates a large administrative burden and that the 
end result of a section 482 enforcement action is too often 
unpredictable and subjective. 
1/U.S. Congress, House, Allocation of Incorrc~ Betwe-;n Relnted 
- Foreign and Domestic Organ zat ons, 87th Congre~:;s., 2nd sess., 
Ho~E~e--Rept. 144-;T(l962T.-- ---- ----
2/Richard A. Gordon, Tax Havens and Th ir Use_by UnitE~(l Stclte::> 
- T2~~pil)"CLE.; ---·~.rr o_':C£\IJ ew T~J?! -in'] tor1_:_ 19 n YT~ 
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l\ l ~}}/_ : .. 1 \l(1y 1)y f J·~(~ ("t_)Jlf(-'1-r'.'J!CC: ~-~J),-:,1 \1 d(-)('~lJl'l,··;,f (-:d 1 he~ \/] 1 ··\.'S 
c)[ ·,), 1,,,-,l:,, c,Jfi,·io~ls. 1/ Tlt•'ir ;n·ilt< i1•·1l c,)Jjl··c:l ir>~l:; \r) 1:-~:::;· 
:c·< ic.Jl .]d/. ,.,,j",,(<'l'il•'lli' <,•c<; 1 11;;t (1) I)H; .-,,J,Jl.ytie2l ·'l'l··r·r·,,,·h 
to :,:tc:Citi•Jinq dl!n's 1:•tlC)Lh ~)1:i1·c;s oft,~n l;:ac1s to ~lnt·ea:><>:J<Jf)]e 
r-•·:~i'Jlts ;1nd (2) the cx.·nninat.ions require extensive cocporatc 
<'Xj)<'rF;e and lahur. The follO'wing are sor:1e specific cri.tieisr:1s 
of corpordt.e offici :'lls as '~ocumentc('1 in the Conference Board 
report. 
Sor.le of fie i als believed the fundamental concept of .1.rm' s 
lensth dc;al ing betvJeen related corpor<:1tions is unrealis-
tic. In a ·.,;orld of compei:ition arnong multinational firms, 
they ,, sk -,,hy the parent corporat) on shou 1 d not favor its 
S'lbs i <J i.-lJ i ·~·s over unn f f i 1 i <> i'~ed corporations. The s tJb,; i r1 i-
aric~s ar1.3 ('>:pr.::cted to pi1y divic1enc1s while the 'HF1ffi1L1t.C'd 
<:orpor a 1· ions <J re not. 
SOH;r~ offi cia 1 s dc~scr:i bed the CX<Jr.tiner' s detenninati on of 
an dr,n's lenqth price <'is "arbitrary." Sorne corporC>te tax 
cxt:cul Lves stat.,d that they did not know how the C'Xillili nr:r 
<JOt the fiqurc proposed, and the examiner either could 
not. or would not <?xplain its derivation. In some of thc~~::;e 
cases, 1 he corpora t_ ion ;l ccept ed the figure heca use the 
proposc'd <:idjuslJnent was small. 
--Some officials drew attention to the expense and labor 
involved in international examinations. The officials 
objected to ~1at they considered an unnecessary load of 
paperwork. For example, the tax mar1ager of one company 
declined to guess the cost of satisfying IRS examiners 
that international transactions do not violate section 
482 regulations, although he believed the costs to be 
consi0crable. 11e said that he did not object because he 
considers the defense against IRS allocations a necessary 
function of his tax department. He did state, however, 
that the examiners raise many questions that take time 
and trouble to answer without being closely related to 
the examination. 
A J980 study report 2/ indicates that the concerns of cor-
porate officials as inclu~ed in the 1972 Conference Board Report 
are still concerns today. The study showed that arm's length 
prices have not been successfully applied to the extent antici-
pated by IRS when the regulations '.vere ·:ipproved. The s t.udy 
staLed that, while the arm's length standard is based on the 
_!_/Duerr, .?P. cit. 
~/Burns, o.r.. cit. 
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p::e ,i thctl a Stl1)-,1rli;clr-y is lt>(_J-;lly an'l c,·,,cv,,t\.lly :;·;· ,•,. 
fron. its parent corpor-ation, only 41 pet·c,~nt of thi· cocp ,,-dtion:; 
indicated that their organizations actually operate in this man-
ner. In addition, the study showed that while the corporations 
wer com2osed of nu~erous legalLy separate entities, 4~ percent 
stated that they malze rctost intf:rcorapCJny pricing dc.>c1 sions as 
though the organization was one economic unit. The stu~y con 
eluded that this difference in philosophy between the arnt' s 
length standard and multinational corporations is basic to the 
section 482 controversy. The 1980 study also concluded that (1) 
considerable uncertainty surrounds the implem.::·ntation of section 
482 through the regulations, and (2) section 482 adjustments are 
very costly. Although most corporate officials indicated in both 
studies that they accepted the artn's length premise, they ex-
pressed concern that the regulations were vague and confusing. 
sc~vera l court decisions have also poj ntec1 ou L t.he admi nis-
trative difficulty in section 4R2 ac'ljustmcnts. Specifically, a 
Court of Claims judge's decision in a 1978 case involving E. I. 
Du Pont De Nemours and Company sta ed the following: 
"As evidenced by the magnitude of the record compiled in 
this case, the resolution by tr:al of a reallocation con-
troversy under section 482 can be a very burdensome, time-
~onsuming and obviously expensive process--especially if 
the stakes are high. A more manageable and expeditious 
means of resolution should be found. The evidence ad-
duced in this case through Dr. Irving Plotkin, a skilled 
practitioner of the discipline of econometrics, strongly 
suggests that the promulgation of universally applicable 
safehaven criteria to facilitate the administration of 
section 482 may now be both entirely feasible and emi-
nently pr9per." }:./ 
Another regulation problem--uncertain SLirfaced as a re-
sult of an Appeals Court decision in 1980 to revcr.-se an earlier 
Tax Court ruling in a case involving the U.S. Steel Corporation. 
The Appeals Court accepted a price from a transaction which IRS 
and the Tax Court deemed not comparable because there were sig-
nificant differences in the circumstances of the intercorporate 
transaction and the transacti_on used as a comparahle. The de-
cision stated the following: 
"In v e. c y f e ,;.~ indus t r i e ::; a r e trans a t ion::; t r u 1 y cor<;: 1 c-, 
able in the strict sense used by Judge Qu aly. Every 
transaction in wheat, for exi'lmple, is more or les:> thr~ 
se>,ne, except for stctnc'lard V0ri0tions in amcJLwl, tirae of: 
1/ I. Du Pont De Ne1:1.:~mr a n :l Co r:1p ct n y v • U • S . , 60fl 2ncl. 
-(Ct. Cls. 197')). 
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1•'it''Jh ~-;t,_·,!l '"'·'s 1n1yin9 a ~;<~l:vice f1om ~·J.-ivios ~rrLLh nne 
o_;et. of . cxrwctat~ions .1bout ,1urat_inn and risk, and [lJ.S.] 
t;L,:•col ;1not:.her, ;11ay be to recognize economic rr'alit:y; 
but it is also to engraft a crippling degree of eco-
nomic sophisi.i.crJ.t.ion onto a badly dr::rv~n st.:ti:utc \vhich--
i f ' co rnp arab l e ' i s t a k en t o me an ' i dent i c a 1, ' a s J u r1 g e 
Q\ll::a ly would .c cad i t----'>vou ld allow the tilxpayer no 
safe harbor from t.he Commissioner's virtually un-
restricted discretion to reallocate." l_/ 
One tax expert, in coDmenting on the jur1icial history of 
section 482, sair1 that when readily con~arable transactions 
have bh?n avai1;Jb1e the Jecisions by the courts have been ratJ1er 
st.raiCjht.forw-'lrd. llo·,.;cver, when readily comparable t.ransi'ictions 
were not obtainer1 the courts have had much greater r1ifficulty in 
reaching a judgment. In such cases, the courts have genera1.ly 
recpiired the corporation to show that its i ntercorpora t.e trans-
action prices are correct rather than showing that IRS' alloca-
tion is erroneous. 
IRS representatives have also expressed concerns about the 
subjectivity of section 482 adjustments. For example, they told 
us that.: 
--An examiner develops a price after studying all available 
data. However, the examiner has no assurance that the 
price developed is an arm's length price. The concept of 
an arm's length price is great in theory but in practice 
the price established is judgmental. 
--An ex21miner finds it very difficult to obtain comparable 
uncontrolled prices. Approval from the third party is 
needed if a disclosure of the information is to be made. 
Generally third parties are reluctant to grant disclosure 
permission because of market competitiveness and the se-
crecy surrounding corporate activity. 
t1uch of the criticism of section 482 enforcement, re<;ard-
less of the source, seems to center on the incompatability be-
tween the nature of multicorporate business activities and the 
arm's length standard. The nat.ure of modern mul ticorporate busi-
ness activities makes it difficult for IRS examiners to locate 
cor;-,parable uncontrolled prices on -which to base adjustments. 
l/U.S. ~;1 c'el Corpc)rat.ion v. Corrlfnissioner of Internal Revenue, 617 
--- F • 2 d 9 4 2 ( 2 n d C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) • 
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For example, the 1972 Conf<:?ren e BCld!d repnr-t and other 
studies by tax experts gave several reasons v:hy the cornpiirabl e 
uncontrolled price method is seldom used in developing tangible 
property adjustments. These studies point out that many products, 
such as components and sernifinished goods, are sold only to con-
trolled subsidiaries because multinationals are often structured 
as an integrated production process. For such transactions, no 
open market equivalent exists. Other products, such as finished 
goods and raw materials, may be sold to both controlled and un-
controlled buyers, but the transactions may not be comparable 
because (1} different customers have different amounts of bar-
gaining power, (2) custorners have different objectives and are 
governed by different laws and regulations; and (3) customers 
receive different amounts and kinds of service. 
In addition, the Conference Board report points out that the 
concept of a comparable uncontrolled price does not always cor-
respond to intercorporate pricing pr tice. Only a few corpora-
tions base their intercorporate price on comparable uncontrolled 
transactions. From questionnaires sul ,itted by 512 corporations 
and 90 personal interviews, Conference Board researchers learned 
that corporate officials base prices for intercorporate transac-
tions on long-range plans, not on prices for comparable uncon-
trolled transactions. Corporate officials more often ask the 
question "What are we earning this year and what will we earn 
5 years from now?" rather than ''What is the correct markup per-
centage on this component?" 
In addition to long-range planning considerations, other 
factors may influence intercorporate prices. For example, a par-
ent corporation may engage in a transaction with its foreign sub-
s iary at a low price in order to give the subs diary a ti-
ve advantage in the foreign market. Intercorporate pricing 
pract ces may also differ from uncontrolled transactions because 
a subsidiary is expected to pay dividenrls where an unrelated cor-
poration is not. It is argued, moreover, that intercorporate 
prices are often not a matter of public knowledge and that even 
if a corporation wanted to base a transfer price on a comparable 
transaction, the corporation might have difficulty finding the 
necessary information. 
F lly, some experts on section 482 enforcement argue that 
treating intercorporate transactions as separate taxable events 
conducted at arm's length can result in the creation of false 
profits or losses. They base this argument on the preillise that a 
gain or loss cannot actually be realized until a transaction is 
made between a member of the controlled group and an independent 
party. 
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r n 1 ') 11 I R s s t. a 1- i s t i c s c on f i r: ,lC: d that t h c r e i s o ftc n a l a c k 
of ,:or.·.plc.::~ble uncontrolled trZ'Insactions on v;hjch to hnse CJ.rm's 
lc··;Jijth prices for s.;ctinn 482 a<'ljustments. In conn,?ction vJi·th 
th se statistics, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Trr>asury, 
in a June 1971 rH~moronrJum, made the following com;ncnts: 
"We t'hink it is time to concede that in the absence of 
comparable t.h i ro party transactions pJ ainly ana] ogous 
to the transaction being cxamineo, the most we can 
1l•)pe for is tl1e :1:=:.~-;ur;1ncc of a reasonahle return to 
111c fJ. S. L1XfFJyer for its cost and effort in produc-
iiVJ or market.ing the proouct, as t.he case may be. In 
c;;se s where such t.hird·-p·"'irty comparahles are not readi-
ly available, a precisely correct determination of the 
hy_?oth,~tical arm's length price is impossible. Under 
the best of ci1:cumstances the answer finally settled 
upon cCJ.n only he a rough and unproven estimate of what 
would have been the terms of the transaction if the 
parties had not been relat.erl." 
During 1971 Treasury and IRS considered, but did not ir~le­
ment, several regulation changes involving the sale of tangible 
property transactions. The changes were consirlered to make sec-
tion 482 enforcement using the arm's length st_andard less fliffi-
cult anfl ;nore fair. l'"ccording to t.he Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
consifleration of the changes was needed because of the persistent 
criticism of the regulations by corporate officials, professional 
groups, corporate associations, and trends in court cases. The 
propos(:!d cho ngcs were c i rcu 1 a ted to Treasury, IRS, and the De-
partment of Justice for co~nent but no action was taken. The 
proposed changes included: 
--Reducing uncertainties encountered by multinational corpo-
rations in determining whether an intercorporate transac-
tion would be subject to an adjustment by revising the 
regulations to extend the use of safe haven pricing. 
--Revis1ng the priorities given to various methods of deter-
Dining an arm's length price. Specifically, only prices 
actually oht.;:;ined from col1lparable uncontrolled trelnsac-
tions involvi g the corporation in question would be given 
priority. The search for an arm's length price would thus 
be limited to within the corporation. 
--Specifying in the regu 1 at ions how the ex.>mi ner should a r-
r i v e .-, t 0. n " n n ' s 1 c rv_; t h p r i c e 'v·ih c: n u s i n g t h e f o 11 r t h ( "'' n y 
ot hr:r") 
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l'1.. 1978 Clc,si_ng ffi>?l~:()'C~\n 1tl~1 nr-,f-r?.1 t(JCtt-~ s:"··,./ ((")l of t,rl(~ ('(', ':l ~~·~t·s 
rec2ivcd Otl t11e prcJpC)SCC1 C1lilt19CE> ir1r1ic~d.tec1 t'rt t lctrgc f)tl::)inc:.J~:_;c·~; 
~ould benefit while small businesses would be adversely aEfecteJ. 
other corrunents indicated an overall satisfaction with the exist-
ing regulations. IRS' EconotTlic Advisory Group commenter1 that the 
9ror·osc:'d changes would condone the non-ann's len<Jth pricing of 
intc:- r-curporate transactions and significantly reduce the rE"-~t-_'nUE' 
IRS achieves from section 482 enforcement. Apparently for these 
reasons, no further action was taken. 
TREASURY SHOULD STUDY THE 
-------------~---- --
IBILI'l'Y OF IrvlPROVING THE 
REGULl\T IOt\JS 
The regulation changes considered by Treasury and IRS were 
drafted in 1971. Since then, experts in the field of section 482 
enforcement, independent studies such as the 1972 Conference Board 
Study, court opinions, and corporate officiAls hc:\ve continuec'l to 
express substantive criticisms of the uncertainty an(1 adm nislra-
tive burden created by the section 49~ regulations. The valid-
ity of the arm's length premise has been questioned and specific 
changes to the regulations have been s 0gested. 
We believe the problems experienced in implementing the 
section 482 regulations are sufficiently serious to be addressed. 
To do this, Treasury should, as a first step, undertake a study 
to evaluate the feasibility of the suggested changes to section 
482 as well as to identify additional ways to allocate income. 
Some of fie ia 1 s have suggested chan<Jes to the r egu1 at ionc'> 
which would provide greater certainty before an IRS examina-
tion an•J would thus allow them to b<~tter plan their fin;1nc·ia1 
strategy. The suggestion offered most frequently by corporz;_te 
officia1s was that Treasury identify some rnc~;c,ns of est2,t)lishing 
a rang~:-, of prices within which U.S. corporations could operate 
without fear of later adjustments. Some executjves have sug-
gested that safe haven ranges be worked out on an industry or 
proch: t-line basis. Others have suggC>st_c;\1 that sorY::: division of 
pro f h::: tv.: e c,; n the U • S . corp or ct t i o n a n d i t =-~ f o r e i g n subs i c1 i a r i e s 
be set as a reasonable yardstick. In either case, the off cials 
beli v 1 the safe haven range would elimjnate the uncertainty 
cone rnin') th'' pricing of intercorporate transactions and reduce 
•Cc~<luctive administra.tive cc1 s to bot-_h thr: C(1rpor<ttiono:; ancl 
IRS. Uncl•:rlying the com•ncnt:c; of nvtny officiiils wl1o f<tvoc,·cl <t 
s fr:: h,v..:;n r~itl'JC for pcicin•J is the COfl'Ji('l icJ t.·h tl ~;\lc·1~ il rc~r,::J•', 
hur:\:--:_•r djf[icult to est~et'nlir;h, would b• ilrl irlil)r-1)'/ 1 :.1•·;,[ (J'/•_t lfi'' 
presf.:r,t sy tcm of d.:::Len,drdny arm's lcnc L1t pric•·';. Thr: CXL'·lrtl··cl 
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111 ~~ ;(,, l:'J•·r• r., ']0 ·:. ld be no worsr: off th:tn they :tre o•J0y. 
1 'h c y , ) u l d s t iJ l h " v e I o b car the h u r J en o f pro vi n CJ t. h at the i r 
prices were justified. 
Tax c::xpcrts, in articles based on court cases, st.uc1ies, .1ncl 
t)t·1lt~.C CJllrc~cs of .inforrnc:ttion, have also stated that reguldtion 
c:h.1ngcs .:ctre neer1ed. 'rheir suggest.ions have generally revolved 
around the use of safe havens and profit spJits as acceptable 
,.,,~thocis to use in rlctcr;rdnirHJ S~'Ction 482 inccllne .1llocatinns. 
For cx;1ntp1c, curpoc~1t.e o[fic~i,1ls ~3u<JrJc~sted in i:h(:! 3urns s1-_ur1y 
t 1Jat Tr-c snry ('Xp<>r <1 the use of s:>fe 'haven rul ~~s, est.abl ish ac--
('Pptahle profit. ~;pliis or i1. rninLnurn pc~rcenLi<Je of the profit to 
he inr::lu(1er1 in u.s. incor:l(', ano arlopt fornmlas such as those 
·iVai],-Jble to Dor:-v~stic Int0rnational Sales Corporations (DISCs) 
for c a 1 c u l ,j t. i n <J t. r a n ~; [ c' r p r· i c r: s • 
Tn connect i.on vd t.h the i1l1ove cu:nrn,~nts, IRS h.:1s estahLi shed 
{~(·ntr:aJ i;;,cd pricin<J nni ts [or a few co:nmodities (see p. 6}. 
Th se unj ts <:ont.rol the price t.hat must be used by interna-
tinnal exa1niners in making section 482 adjustments. The price 
established by the pricing units is known by both corporate of-
ficials and IRS examiners. According to IRS, the pricing units 
were established to better use limited resources and to provide 
for uniform and consistent treatment of common issues among cor-
porate taxpayers. 
C·ible, 
----ndard 
Other experts and studies have questioned the validity of 
the premise underlying the arm's length standard that a parent 
corporation and its subsidiary are in all instances operating 
;:; s two separate corporations. 'i'hes e experts and studies have 
.'Jrgue\1 th;'lt wh>~n a nulti.national p;;,rent's operations are suffi-
c ntly integrated with its foreign subsidiaries, formula appor-
tionment, as used by the States, is a more appropriate method 
to use in allocating the income. In these situations, they bc-
li e the arm's length standard is fundamentally flawRd because 
it is not consistent 'N'ith the economic reality of the operations 
of the related corporate group. 
In contrast t.o the arm's length standard, formu 1 a apportion-
men under the unitary method views controlled corporations which 
C r"1ur~t int0>gratc~d bu:;lr~c:ooS per0tions c'lS a Si!1<Jle unit or 1J•lsi-
;;z';S (or r:'lx pnl·pc)c;r's. Tl-re pr.::J ise is that tlv::se controlled 
c rp•J atinns ;1re conr·,JirJ:dcd by a central ::'.ana']em,3nt policy and 
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:1 ':1:' izati0n1l struclllC·_·, v:hich s,-~,-~1:: tow,, iY.•' or .. Jiir:c:. 11 1'; 
ar-guc,1 thc1t since all of the contru1le-1 ccnrJuC•lli~lr.'; w::ich iJ.Yc; 
involved in the integra ted operations are cons i(ie rc,1 to be part 
of the same unitary business, intercorporate transactions cannot 
produce a real economic gain or loss. Thus, profit or loss is 
det.en::i ned solely by trans0ctions l.vith unrelale(1 bu';ines:;es, the 
s:u:'-.; as for a "truly" independent corpocatioc. 
Under formula apportionment, a formula is used to apportion 
the income between the commonly controlled corporations. The 
forrt;ula represents the relationship of the in,'lividua l corpora-
tion's activities to the total activities for the CO'llrolled 
group. The factors most discusse~ for use in the formula arc 
the ones used by the States to tax multistate and multinational 
manufacturing and mercantile corporations. All 45 States which 
tax corporate income use some combination of propE!rty, payroll, 
and sales as formula factors. The apportioning of the income by 
such a for•nula is raerely a device for the division of the incor•v:: 
earned. The formula does not impos any tax on the income. 
Formula apportionment might elimt ate 
SOrTie probleras. associated with ___ us.f'ng __  t11ea-rrn · 5-Te--th--starviarCi ___________ -----
Advocates of formula apportionment indicate that thi c; 
method is not only more appropriate to use in situations involv-
ing integrated operations among controlled corporations but could 
actually eliminate some of the problems associated with using the 
arm's length standard. Advocates claim that this has been demon-
strated by the States, particularly California. 
They explain that the States use formula apportionment pri-
marily because of (l) the extensive potential for tax avoida e 
through non-arrn' s l eng Lh t rans.'lct ions be tv:ec:n con trolled. co rpoca-
tions, (2) the neen to substantially incr ase the numb r of their 
auditors to adclress this potentia] throu tht: arm's length st2,nd-
ard, and (3) the belief that enforcement through the arm's length 
standard is not working well at the Federal level. They also 
point out that formula apportionment eliminates the arm's length 
assumptions that 
--an arm's length market price can always he established; 
- -- g en c· r a 1 o v e rhea d an rl a,] m L n i s t rat i v e e x L' c~ n s e s c 21 n lh' fa i r 1 y 
allocat_ed arrong the cor•\!Ponly controlle3 corporat.ions in 
valved in the integrated operations; and that 
- - i t i s p o s s i b 1 e to d e t e r m i n e the p rope r cUIVJ u n t o f p r o f i t 
a l 1 o c a t i o n t o d i f f r· e n t f u tt t i o n s <; u c h a s rn. H1 1 1 f; 1 r:: t u r- i n c; 
anc1 selling. 
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l·i<Y ~~•J ;11>t KL~J\V .-1t. tlte tiTl!i2 t ran[;at:t_i,()nS t . .:!.kr~ r)J .~cc wllr-i·;Jc:r tJ-lC:Y 
will J··-'·1Jlt~ in ili1 ,.;:s alh tion and· (2) t_hat L11cy ;1rc operating 
r,: ·1•.·1- r'"'<JUl -d :ions cha[act:c:-rized as vagu0, confusing, -3nc1 j '"pos-
sH;Je to intcrpH"t in tenn.s of internaLional businr>ss. 
For;:ml a apport.ionment would 
i)r j ~,-C:n t--(I1if e r-c n t 
Critics of formula apportionment raise several abjections to 
its use. The rnoce important criticisrns include (1) t_he diffi-
c u 1 t y i_ n d c: f i n i n g t h o s e con t r o ll e d co 1~ pur 0. t i on s ·w h i c h s hen 1 d be 
incl1J<'l1~d in the~ <lnitary bu~;in•,Gs operations of the ~:lUlt_jn:ii ion;1l 
t'•)l llor;Ji· ions; ( 2) the 1 ack of comparc"lbi 1 ii·.y of tl1e fdct.ors \J~;ed 
in 1hc fol!IH11.1. ft•Jm one country t.o another; (3) the administra-
tive b1n·t1r:n Js:-:;oc"iated with ob-taining the data n·~eaed to use for-
':mla apportionment; and, (4) the fact that the arm's len(Jth siand'-
ctrd has world..vioe acceptance. 
Advocates acknowledge that the t'1bove criticisms of formula 
apport ionrnen t have va lini ty. However, they also believe t.ha t 
these problems have solut.ions. For example, they recognize that 
a corporation would not know in advance of an IRS examination 
whether or not it would be consjdered unitary unless the defini-
tion of unitary is uniformly applied and administered. '1owever, 
they also cite one State which uses formula apportionment under 
the unitary concept as having initiated an advance ruling program 
to eliminate this problem. 
The advocates also acknowledge that there may be some dis-
tortion in the factors used in the formula from one country to 
another. However, t.hey believe that it is possible to elimjnate 
the distort1on in the factors--to a great extent--through the 
use of comparability tables. Concerning the administrative bur-
den, the advocates indicate that some U.S. multinational corpo-
rat.ions now prepare sophisticated financial analyses for U.S. 
purposes and that this information could be used in applying the 
apportionment formulas. As such, formula apportionment should 
not place any greater burden on the administrative resources of 
the corporations than the arm's length standard. They also be-
lieve that formula apportionment would place much less of a bur-
den on IRS' resources than does section 482 enforcement under the 
arm's length standard. They indicate that this is one of the 
r,:;'l;-:;Dns why the StatPs have ac'lopted this methorl. 
COL\lCLUSIONS 
Making income adjustments using the arm's length standard 
has posed ~~ministrative burdens on both IRS and corporate tax-
P"Y'"r:,;. n,,r· 11se of the structure of t"he ;.,or}el-n bt1si:'l.,ss ·..vorld, 
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justm<C,nts but must insteud construct a price. A~-; u rc':;ult., cor·-
porate taxpayers cannot be certain how income on intercorporate 
transactio_ns that cross national borders will be adjusted and 
the enforcei,\ent process is difficult and time-consuning for both 
IRS ~nd taxp2yers. 
Parties affected by and knowledgeuble about arm's length 
adjustments--officials at IRS and Treasury, corporate taxpayers, 
courts, and experts in the field--have voiced substantive and on-
going criticisms of the section 482 regulations. Treasury's de-
cision in the early 1970s to consider several regul~tion changes 
indicates that it recognized the validity of the criticis~ at 
that time. Given the continued flow of critic~sm since then and 
the continued growth in the number and complexity of intercorpo-
rate transactions as compared to IRS' limited resources, it seems 
to us that the need is even gre ter now than it was a decade ago 
for Treasury to consider revisi g the regulations. 
Experts have suggested that chcL'ging the regulations to 
expand the use of the safe haven conc~pt would bring greater cer-
tainty to the enforcement process. Other experts have suggested 
that using the formula apportionment method, when appropriate, 
would eliminate the need to search for an arm's length price, 
reduce administrative burden, and make section 482 enforcement 
more certain. The States, whose examination resources are even 
more limited than IRS', use formula apportionment for these 
reasons. 
A major objection to the usc of formula apportionment across 
national borders is that tax treaties between the U.S. and other 
nations specify the arm's length standard for adjusting corporate 
income. For the U.S. to adopt a different method could result in 
multinational corporations incurring double taxation. We r cog-
n i z e the s i g n i f i can c e o f t h i s p cob l e ·n • How c~ v e r , w c a 1 s o be 1 i e v E:: 
that as a world lerJder anc1 internation.tl policy-sett.er, the U.S. 
should not be hesitant to take the lea~ in searching for better 
ways to administer the tax consequences of intercorporate trans-
actions that cross national boundaries. 
In this regard, Treasury should be the focal point for a 
stucJy to identify wuys to improve section 432 enforcement. The 
need for such a study will beccnilC: evc:n more u rg<:.'n t if IRS' meas--
ure shows extensive noncon:[>LLanc<c;. Aft r Treas ry has cor;•pletecJ 
this study, it should be able to make an informed decision as to 
whether and how it should ch2nge th section 482 reg:_llations. 
ENDATION TO THE SECRETARY 
-----·-·---- --
OF TW: TR!·~r.,_c;(J!:-ZY 
vle reco<qrnencl thz\t thP Sc·ct-t.: rlf·y of thr· Tn•.:';l!r·y ini t i<~ 1 1' it 
s t u rl y t () i ch· [ l t i f y d n ( l e v l l : ) : ! ' ' t: h " f ( . d . ' ; : ' i 1 1 t y u r w ' '/ ' t ( ' d 1 1 ') 
c (1 l c.~ i r l c { _) ~ d ll n '· 1 t ' t . ;_; (~ (~ t. i. CH -1 'l /-, I j p { • 1 u d i { \' f ( } t ' ! I n l l rt r) ; . } l l (-) : ! I • ' I t I 
100 
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1 d ~: ,-· 1 1 {, t i , j i l d t; ]l I 1 1 c: • i :_; i n tJ r c tJ u 1 ;1 t i r:, n s . 
<;;.:,cy ('(_/·W.t·:I~TS :'\D 
< •U 1-<. i<\1 U J!..,'J' lUN 
\vh1 le LRS .:nd TLQZl.sury recognizsd t};at s.:"ct.ion 482 <:nforce-
;;;r:nt~ proc:•dures pr sent probJ ems, both agencies expressed rlis-
<<gr<:un(;nt v;i th c.ur r ccH:Jii•'lldation that Treas ry undertake a study 
of the regulati.uns. In so doing, both agencies, we believe, 
Ii1'inind ?,ed the seriousness of the difficulties which section 482 
n [orccJnent h0s pi~esented and continues to present o.ll affectc:d 
F'<LtiPs. As we noted in our report, uncert~ainty as ·.vell as the 
,,.<,ninist~rat.ive difficulties <Hid burden on all part.ies aff<'~.:tcd 
by :;t-:ct.ion 482 enfor:cc:Hl•~nt l1ave been documcnLed in all pr vicus 
sludj;;s on the subject, the Ji!OSt recent being a January 1981 
sLudy undertaktc.n at the joint request of the Acting Corrunissionc;r 
of lRS, the Assistant Attorney General, and the Assistant S~cretary 
of the Treasury for Tax Policy. 
In addition, both Treasury and IRS expressed serious reser-
V<;Li ns about our statistics and seemed to think thctt they pre-
G(:rlt.r~d a Htisl(~ading pi ct:ure of section 482 enforcement. Goth 
agone i c s sP-cJ;H~d to believe we understated the extent of pre:>r::nt 
:;<::ct ion 482 en forc01nent and overstated the adm istrati ve di ffi-
cult.:ies. We incorporated into the report more specific recog-
nition that IRS e some section 482 adjustments which we ex-
cluded from our sample. We also clarified the explanation of 
our scope and our rationale for excluding certain adjustments. 
We believe our statistics accurately reflect the pertinent data 
available and, together with the other evidence presented in the 
rc~ort, convincingly show that the problems inherent in enforcing 
sect o 482 are substantial. 
IRS s emed to interpret our report as recommending that 
T ~ sury r consider the fundamental principle of the arm's 
1 ngt:.h sta <lard. In this regard IRS pointed out that Treasury 
was in the process of r sing the regulations and stated that, 
specifically, Treasury was studying ways to amend the regula-
tions relating to a safe haven rule for the sale of tangible 
property and would publish proposed regulation ch2nges shortly . 
. fRS hought that Treasury's approach of revising parts of the 
re~ula1:ions ~as better than such wholesale reworking of the 
resulations as IRS understood us to have reco~nended. In addi-
tion, IRS did not think that it had enough experience to partic-
ipate in a reconsideration of the arm's length standard. 
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intent that Treasury would take whatever course is indicated 
by the study results. Moreover, we believe that IRS' 12 years 
of ex?erience in this area should enable it to participate ef-
fectively in such a study. 
Treasury stated that it disagreed with our reu!f cc ,c};~t.ion 
that it consider adopting formula apportionnv:::n t as a subs i tu te 
for the arm's length standard. However, we did not make such a 
recom:nendation. What we recormnended was that, as part of its 
study of section 482 enforcement procedures, Treasury should 
consider all alternatives, of which form:.1L1 apportinn.r•;.c:nt. is 
but one. 
Treasury objected to the use of formula apportionment on 
several grounds. Treasury stated that formula apportionment has 
little merit because a corporation could have an increas2d tax 
burden as a result of its subsidia : s bee ing more profitable. 
Thus, according to Treasury, formul apportionment does not at-
tempt to achieve the statutory objec ve of correctly reflecting 
a taxpayer's income. Treasury also asked whether formula appor-
tionment should be used even when comparable uncontrolled prices 
are available. 
Treasury's response suggests to us that Treasury may have 
thought we recommended the use of formula apport ionm<:;n t to mdke 
income adjustments in all cases. In contrast to the arm's length 
standard, formula apportionment under the un i t.ary method vi e'.v'S 
cotttrolled corporations which conduct integrated business opera-
tions as a single unit or business for tax purposes. The formula 
is used to apportion the income between taxing juris~ictions. 
Since the formula sources the income of thE: controlled gr.·oup to 
each taxing jurisdiction, arm's length price determincttion:; for 
indi vidua 1 transact ions are not needed. Ho<d ve r, it is impoclanl 
to keep in mind that formulas are applied only to unitary busi-
nesses. If the controlled corporations are not considered to be 
unitary in their business operations, then any transoctions that 
need to be adjusted would be adjusted using the arm's length 
standard. Thus, if, after its study, Treasury were to decide 
to use formula apportionment, it would simply have an additional 
enforcement tool available to complement the arm's length app 
T rea. s u r y fur the r s t a t e c1 t h a_ t we m i n rrt I'>" cl t rv· iJ <1 n i !'; l r <:· 
tive difficulties t.h~.t would rest1lt fron' tht.: uc:; of forntulc: ap 
portionrnent. As an exn.mple, Treasury cited the pr.:,ctical pro'r>-
lems involved in deciding whether or n6t a corporation should 
be consic1erec1 unitary. It was not our inteot to minimize the 
adrninistrative difficult.ie,; nor to e i z.; the ben fits of 
fon,~11la apportionrn:.•rt!::.. It w;:~s ou inh:~nt, how vc:~r, t.o point. 
out that the appr·oitch is characteci.ze,-1 ·both by b~:nr.··fi ts ;nt·l 
difficultie::.; and to give exampleo> of e ch (s PEJ· 50 t.o 52)· 
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'r'7e ~ IJ,'l Jt;t_··~1 a. ,l ,('·J~:si 1H1 c)f [<_ir· .lJl <'l .-ll~t..)()ri" ir:Jn:.·l:-nt i11 ur r iH)rt 
,:·•'C ..:u:;e J' ;-Jx exl.-;~:>J i-s n/i ~:;-' ~~r3ir~s 'tlC P:-Jcc;untt:.red. ir1 
eil··d f.;n 1la ·'Pi'')rtiot• -·nt_ ."\:3 on•:: a1t-c n._,tive -t1F'lt t 1es-
·:cn .-,1!:-nini :.->t.r._lt ivc 1·urr1 n :1nd <JnccrL'li nty. Thct-e i , hc·.;<:v··r, 
ll<) ;:,piri(:al •;vj,1,,rwe :n; iL:1ble to prove or (Ji~;prove the f,-·;~s­
ibility of impl•'!ll<'nting Lhe Ctpproach at the Fcderal level. It 
was our 1 nt.:nt th<'lt the Tn·:.~1sury stuc1y we recommen•Jr:od would rle-
v e 1 o p s u c h c rnp i r j c a 1 c v i c1 en c e • 
Tn::zjsury also stated t_}1at formula apportionment is not 
widely used by the States in a ~1lticorporate context. Treas-
ury .=ll so SCI id that }:;orne States which apply the formulas '>vor ld-
v.;irle are cnnsir1<'r inq ar).::u1<Joning them. However, Treasury (_jave no 
support for t1l•':Je staLelflcnts. Evidence available to us does not . ' . . . support Treasury s contcnt1on. In response to a quest1onna1re 
we sent to each of the 45 States with a corporate income tax, 
2 6 Sta t~es replied that they use formula apportionmE•nt under the 
unitary method in cases involving multicorporate entities (af-
filiated corporations) located within the United States while 
11 States replied t.hat they apply formula apportionrnent world-
wide. None of the States responding to the questionnaire indi-
cated an intent to abandon formula apportionment. To our knowl-
e~ge, the only change that a State is currently contenplating 
to restrict rFlthcr than expand the use of formula apportionment 
is in the form of legislation being considered in California. 
That legislation would restrict the use of formula apportionment 
only to the extent of excluding foreign parents of U.S. corpora-
tions in certain types of industries. 
Both Treasury and IRS cited a 1979 report by the 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development in s 
their reservations about the use of formula apportionment. 
IRS suggested we state in our report that OECD has rejected 
the use of formula apportionment because it presents difficul-
ties for taxpayers. Treasury suggested we consider the OECD 
criticism of formula apportionment as inconsistent with the pro-
visions of current u.s. tax treaties. We did consider the O~CD 
report during our re ew. We chose not to discuss the OECD com-
ments on formula apportionment because they were not supported 
by empirical data to the same extent as other studies which we 
did include. The OECD statements that formula apportionment 
presents difficulties for taxpayers were based on comments sub-
mitted by its J.l•?mber countries, and the O;<~CD report does not pre-
sent Pmpirical r'lc-d-_a to support its conr:c1usions. The OF:CD r~_~port 
did, however, correctly ?Oint out that use of alternatives to the 
a.nn' s length standard is incompatible with the OECD t'iodel Double 
Taxa.tion Convention. Again, we did not recommend that Treasury 
should implement formula apportionment much less undertake any 
such imple;-ncntat:ion unilaterally. If a Treasury study were to 
s1lOW hLOiJ<]h ,-,,,,picical r]at.i1 that fon;;u].l_ ,'1__(:'~''-)rt}o;w-ent did i_n--
d00d have merit, T casury would still n cd to give considerable 
t1•oc_Hjht to t:.he 1lest app1~oach of obtaining inten;ational 
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s~Jr:~·!c)ct. fc)r c··n ~ ~ : :~- :' i~1-r)lf,rt>~~nt·>~~~ i r)n c_~f t.h C'(JC,(',''l)i.. T\ 1 t t·r-t: 
tives might inc·lc:"-c :~--:~ng a le:t,-lt:To_;hip n.Jlt· ztp)':opr·i_;r; ,, to ,: 1 
world power such 2s t~~ U.S. and, in this le~dcr~hip role, ed 
u c a t i n g o the r coL::-_:. :- -'_ :: ::: to the be n e f i t s o f f o r m u 1 a a p p o r t i 1 J n m, n t 
or other technic:·_:,-,: _:::--z;icling for effective irnpler;>enLation. 
Both IRS and ~~~~::~ry seemed to think that our statistics 
presented a misle~~:~: and, in some cases, inaccurate oicture of 
section 482 enfor.::: ::~:., a picture which ovcrstat_ed th~ di ffi-
c u l t i e s in v o l v c :' . i·:" "::' e l i eve o u r s t a t -i s t i_ c s a c c u r a t ~--:: l y r e f 1 c c t 
the data available ~s and convincingly show that the dif-
ficulties involve~ 1~ e~forcing section 482 are both real and 
substantial. 
IRS questior:e,~ -.. ---_::::ther we hacl included all relevant section 
487. adjustments in o.:::- statistics. Speci fic<-t lly, IRS th0119ht 
we erroneously exclc~::~ $330 million n adjustments from our sam-
ple. We excluded the $330 million because these adjustments did 
not involve a foreis~ subsidiary and, hus, did not in a real sense 
cross national hoc~~~=-ies. We focused our review on aJjustcrl 
transactions involvi~; foreign subsidiaries because we believe 
that it is in adju;:;:.~--<':!ts mac:Je to such trans.:1ctions that the real 
workability and effe.:::.iveness of the arm's length stn_nc1ard must 
be measured. 
IR.S also note~: t'-:at our statistics did not include any cases 
frortt the oil inclus:.:ry. IRS assumed that this was because such 
cases v1ere not clcs2.~ during the period covcrccJ by our scu.tpl e. 
IRS was correct in t:-.is assur,tption. Since thr> cL"lta cJvail<:tble to 
us did not incluc1e c:-:s~.,s involving the oil inr1ustry, we C<'HtnoL 
address IRS's stnte:-.2~t that such adjustments exce('d $600 mi lion 
annlFllly. 
IRS also thoL:sht we had understatecl the total nu;;11Jer of ac3-
just.mec:nts which wer:e based on a corctparable uncontrolled price. 
IRS said we should h2ve taken into account that 240 of the 403 
adjustments were attributable to situations whFCre the use of safe 
haven pricing rules w2s mandatory. Had we excluded these 240 
transactions fror;, tha total of 403 adjusU~l<C~nts, we would have 
reportecl that 7 perc~~t, not 3 percent, of IRS' section 4R7 ad 
ju::;tt,,c:rtt.s w·::·re hc1se:: on compc;rab1r~ uncontro1lec1 prices. v1e djcl 
not excludt· thc~;c 2,~,1 ac1ju:-;Lrw:>nts h'1s0:1 on sz1f<' hit'JC!t1 rt!les b(• 
Crtus our purpose w::s to shn\,· how nHny of lh totc1l st:cLion 4f17 
adjusll'E·nts in our s:,:-:cplc vn~rc ba~;c'cl on c rc~ble uncontrolled 
price-:;. Safe haven rricc;::; by definition are not cornrL::rr:tble un-
controlled pricr.::s. R::tl;•·c, they art_~ price::; e~>tdh1ishc·cl r>y IR~; 
an•1 r['rc.:,sury to be u:--:eJ in Sp(~cific si t.uationc;. IRS hzu; recoy--
nizr:-J th21t s fe h;_n·,•:: pric ~; ar-t:, not cot:lp<'crctbl c uth:<Jnl ro1 Lecl 
pci C>':; ancl wi 11 p,,,-,,; t a ccJr·r,ncari on to uc-;r· 21 coup'tr<·'ll;:• 
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. , , i 1 '> I 1 , d i 11 i c ·~ '·. 1 n Lc' ~-:Jlt">rt{·<J. 11 ht1s, jn !t' 1;1s ,)[ tJ!ll: t~.Jtilrlsf2 
(' ,r 1] 1.j 1,"\;r: !; '( n J.i·iill :;s lJ.,rJ ·,, •·xcl•Jd<·d the :;,dO<c: ll'"\!C'n :,dj J:clL,cnt:: 
fJ r,J;t (.il1C t ()JjllJUt;1t icdlS. 
L<S ;,<Jc'lf::d that its current data (1::xaminations cOLtpletc:d dur-
ny f cal yc3r 1980) ~:;llG'd('d that 20 peccent of its J:.·ecor;:,;.•:l1d<:d 
ecLion 482 '"dj,Jst nts were based on ann's 1cn•jth prices ll:;ing 
Lhe CC'.tpnc.•!Jle tmcontxolJ d Ltt.lhod. \'Ve did not 1:evicw the data 
lHS cilc·d and thus do not know whether it is readily comparable 
with our results. Even so, using comparable uncontrolled prices 
in only 20 I:-Jerce:nt of the adjustrr.ents is not, in our opinion, an 
ndicotoc of :.:.ul.Jsidntial :.;;ucccss. 
Trc<Jsut·y thuu,jht we concluded that the [JJ:.c~;,.:nt 1:c'guJ,-itions 
a !J' ~; C' r i o u s 1 y d c· f 0 c l i v e r; o 1 e 1 y be c a u s e the com p a r a b 1 e u nco n l r o 1 l < d 
pdce method is only infn::tjuently used. Tt-c•asury said we failed 
to recognize t:hat uthc:r liiethods outlined in the reyulations are 
on 1 y a 1 L c r n a t i v P s for Lit r r i v i n g a t a n a nn ' s l eng t h p r i c e ii n d no t 
d•·p,n:-tu.rcs from ihat principle. We did distinguish bctw(~en ad-
just nts ba~;ed on the identification of a comparable uncontrolled 
prit.:e and adjustrltents based on an estimated price constructed by 
an IHS c:xaminer using one of the alternative methods permitted 
when a comp<:n.:.lble uncontrollc:d price cannot be easily identified 
(sec pp. 28 to 29). We did so because we do not believe that an 
estimated price is the same as a compacable uncontrolled price. 
Moreover, our conclusion that section 482 enforcement under the 
current tegulations is uncertain and administr-atively burdensome 
is ot based solely on our statistical analysis of the sample. 
Our review of the recent relevant literatur-e by experts in the 
field of section 482 enforcement also led us to this conclusion, 
a conclusion to which ouc statistical analysis lends supp6ct. 
Treasury fucthec pointed out that we did not identify any 
s~ecific iDdications that u contcolled prices are ~ot used in 
cases of intercompany pcicing which do not lead to an IRS adjust-
rnr:::nt. \"ie made no statement concerning such cases because this 
ty~e of information is not available. Neither Treasury noc IRS 
JS cJevelo,tA:?d n1ethods to obtain the data needed to measure the 
extent of noncompliance that exists within the universe of multi-
national co pocations. IRS, however, reed with our recommenda-
tion that it develop such data (seep. 26). Treasury's position 
s ms to be that, if the transaction was not adjusted, it met 
the rm's lenyth standard. We do not think this position is re-
alistic ~hen analyzed in light of the information we wece able 
to obtain. Although the infocmation available to us provided 
only an indication that increased potential for adjustment ex-
ists, we believe this possibility should not be ignoced. IRS 
examjnr·rs to}d us that only a few transactions can be examined 
i!rl if t. li:'.><:t.Jcns ;;reo not ;x."I''i:l<,d, pot,::ntial dju~;lnl'"'·lt:s can-
iHJt be i,', 111 ificd. The:y lr;o stah.d that ;~()r.,e cxc:u;o:inecs give 
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:.L~; l'ric~t·ily t<.J C)L,nt.-:1-- .int r:-~-n,-:t j,~u:ll trl 1 s.:111 ::) l)~ ,~~ ·t-, C)t1:tt 
issues are less difficult and le..:ss tirn>:::-COlt:_,i_ll'tiLq. Oul~ sLdti~; 
tics can be interpreted to lend credence to the exazni ners' state-
ments (see p. 41). 
Treasury further question,:od ou:r· conclusion thot di ffictdti.es 
exist_ in applying the section 482 reg,1lati.on~:; by st·c:tinc_1 th,d_ our 
statistica.l arwlysis we_s misleading or unpersuc>,~;ive. Spocifi--
cally, Treasury objected to our statistic that only 200 of the 
519 corporations experienced adjustments because, according to 
'1' r e z: ~ ~ 1 r y , the ::; c d a t a a r c s u b j e c t to v a rio u s i n t e r p r e to t ion s a n d 
do not nec:essztrily reflect c1ifficu1ties with ano1y·jno the reou-
• • ' ,L J.. __., _J 
lat ton~:>. Tredsury also quest toned our cor;lpC'trlson heL:.\"'Ct:r1 the 
$277.5 million in section 482 adjustments and the $43.5 billion 
total incorC~e of the exa:nineo firms. Treasury statec1 that a sig--
nificant portion of the income may be unrelated to transactions 
between affiliates. To be sure, the fact that only 200 of the 
519 corporations experienced adjustments could he int,:rpretc<'l 
differently, al.though Treasury did not make clear how tl1is might 
be done. We made our interpretation in the total context of in-
formation on section 482 enforcement available to us, including 
examiners' statements that difficulti s in section 482 enforce-
ment may cause some adjustments to be missed, and such statis-
tics as could be developed. We believe thot, taken in a total 
context, the evidence suggests that a greater potential for 
section 482 adjustments does indeed exist. 
Finally, IRS felt that we understated the frequency with 
which comparable uncontrolled prices are used in nk't:ing tangible 
property adjustments, the category of ac1justmenls where the larg-
est amounts of revenue are involved. IRS stated that its more 
current data (examin.:.ttions COFlpleted during fiscal year 1980 and 
6 months of fiscal yec:~r 1981) showed thdt 50 pct:ccnL of thesc-
acljustmE'nts were made usin9 comparable unconlro11cc1 price:.~ (a~; 
opposed to 15 percent in our dat.a base). IRS aclc1cd that the 
oth r· stuc1ies of section 48?. (seep. 33) \vhich shov:c<i thctt. only 
21 to 28 perc~:nt of tangible property arljus\ntc:nts w~:re made 
using cornrv:trahJ ~; uncontrolled prices did not support our con--
clusion. 
We did not review IRS' current data anc1 thus do not knov: if 
it is readily comparable with that in our s;o1nple. Hov:C\!E~r, we do 
believe the other studies of section 482 enforcel:,.c;n support our 
cooc-·lusion th;ct con.pc:trable uncontrolJerl prices are not fre<1ucntly 
used in 1e1aking tangible prop.::rty adjusln;cnt~;. 'I'he other stu(hE.'s, 
completed durin<J 1972, 1973, and 1980 showed th.::Jt ccwtp;:Jrarde un-
controlled prices l.vcre use:td in 2n, 21, and 24 pcrcenL of ta.nCJible 
prC>flCrty adju:c;trn.c_•nts resrJectivcly. 'I'hc hi cr p-.·r-c<:'llL.:lCJt?S shcJ;,;n 
by the thrt:-•c studies and by IRS' currt:.•nt d;:tla n::ty 1:)c' clu,~: t.o the 
fact that tho::e statiE~t.ic~; inclwlc· ac1ju:;Lrw·riLc; inv'~llving DJSC~;, 
Western He:cli::;phc·r·c· Trade Coq•Ordtion~:; (\1/Ill\ .. :~;), and U.S. p<J;;;-, ssion 
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r i t)}·,·l1 r~S. '~;J~ f1 , ... ,Jj;:;;;i ~~·n·~!f S \·.·tj"t-C: liCJt j ~-Jl .. ll_idt-..(1 _i_n C)i1C ~;t-,-1t i ~::;-
j t ~ s 1-_, :·, 1. ,-t 11 :; t~ ~-lJ r~ 1 r ._: J 1 ~~ u. (: t j {) 11 S .. 1 j d l 1 CJ t .i: l V (.) 1 '\l e :1 r :; t \_--. i 1) n '· 1 11) '3 j d i --
·t·cy. ll'1~;·:·,r:! ~~1~~;,-,~3 :11S<) (.<)n(~ltl\.],)d t1-:.1t ~~(;;;tr)<·1r.11)lc: tJn(,_lnt·cnllt~f1 
p c i ' - . -, s \J c '" '1 j f f i c ll 1 t t o i c1 c D t_ i f y ,-, n d vi'~ r e t h u s n o t f r , ~' 11 1 • • : 1 i J y 
u~;.'O in •;:,king Li!!'Jible rn-opc•rt.y ,-lrijusU.,•:nts. t1or,_ovr~r, •·Vf·n if 
f1\S' LiOSt ('lnn:•nt d;1t-a jndic.-d.in(j a ~;ubst<1r1t_ial increase in the 
':c-;(~ of nil's l<?J';•Jt·h prict'S for t . .-.ngihle property adjustJ:H:'nts c•v,:r 
1hat •;h ""'n by ot.hcr stur1ies is rerJcHly con.parable with ourS· :,ple 
lr.-,n~;drct-ic;ns, arL1jnL:>trative bu:nien and unce:ctainty for all c1f-
f ect cd parties vmu ld still exist in one--ha 1 f of all tangible prop-
erty adjustments. 
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASUF~Y 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20?~·J 
As:>lSTANT St.cF-~i:.TARY 
JU L 1 J 1381 
Dear Mr. Anderson: 
I ap:c>recictlE the opuortunity to present thc- Tred~·;ury 
Departmc:nt's corr•mer.ts on the draft GAO report "Alloc liotl of 
Income and Dedl!ction Within Multinatione.l Corporations -·- A 
Growing Proble:r, for IRS, Treasury and Corporate Taxpayers". 
In general, the report contains useful information, but we 
have substantial reservations about its conclusions with respect 
to the problems associat.ed with intercompany pricing. Our 
specific corru:1ents are set forth below. 
Our principal concern with the draft report is the recommen-
dation that the Treasury consider the adoption of formula 
apportionr-,ent as a substitute for the "arm's length" 
principle in the current regulations. This preference for 
formula apportionment is not brtsed on any analysis of the 
conceptually correct method for intercompany pricing, -w'h ich 
should be the starting point for any review of the 482 
regulations. In terms of economic rationale, formula appor-
tionment has little merit because a corporation could have an 
increased tax burden merely as a result of its affiliates 
becoming more profit.:1ble 0r iiS '" rcs:.:l.t of paying higher wu.ges in 
the jurisdiction applying the forn1U la. It therefore do•.:·s not 
attempt to achieve the statutory objective of correctly 
reflecting a taxpayer's incom•:. 
Form,!] :.1 apport ionrn<2nt is not, as the report indi c<>tes, wirl•c 1 y 
used by the states in a multicorporate context. Rather, it is, 
with very few exceptions, used by the states only to divide the 
income of a single multistate corporation, which is a totally 
different matter. 
The report~s case for formula apportionment rests entirely on 
the vie'...r that it would be administratively conv"'rd.e:1t and reduce 
taxpayer uncertainty. Even on this basis, howr:ver, the report is 
not convincing beca'JS<'e it minimizes the practico.l problems with 
respect to formula apportionment. The report docs noL dE>•r.on·-
st.r<ctE· ho•..; such methods woqld improve or sir:·:Jlify th•.c 
i1lustrati.ve cases. P.Jl t::Xdmple of an impoctdrtt practicdl probl~~"' 
in applying formula apportionment in a multination . .~l situation is 
the definition of a llnitary business. In that regard, the report 
is unrealistic in assur..ing that an advdnce ruling system for 
determining the cc'r'\l'vsitior, of the unit;,ry grotrp wou1r1 b,• 
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.;aministrat_ivc:ly Sliiiple. 1\iH)i:tler significant pr2ctic . .,1 prcb1•-·m 
is ·the v2.luaLion of intar,<Jiblr:cs, -..,-h:ich v.;ould be L~.portant~ for 
n;.~ny hi. gh t ,~,~hno] ogy mu 1 t i nat_iona ls. 
It ·.vould al~_;o be useful for the report to review the 
eXJ.:)Prience of jurisdictions that have used the unitary method. 
Some of the few states wno use it, such as California, are 
C:)nsidering abanz3oning it. The expcr:i <:cnce of ~uropr;;:,n countries 
c-ontributrcd to tJ1e very stron<:J OECD criticism of "global" Jin"':"P1ods 
in ir_s 1979 x-"port on t ransfcr pricPs. Hor<"over, fundula 
;3pportiom<>0nt is not consisti?nt wit.h our prc•sent treaty poljcy. 
Finally, the unitary method has been alleged to crr:ate an 
unfavorable business climate for foreign corporations doing 
business in a unitary state. 
The report concludes that the present regulation is ser5ollsly 
defective bece:use t_he comparable uncontrolled price method· is 
only infrequently used in IRS adjustments. We understand that 
t.he IRS has made data available to you indicating that uncon-
trolled prices are used much more frequently than your data 
indicates. In any ce<~se, the report fails to adequately recognize 
t'hat the ot_her methods outlined in the regulations are only 
alternatives for arriving at an ann' s-length price, not depar-
tures from that principle. Furthermore, there is no specific 
indication that uncontrolled prices are not used in cases of 
intercompany pricing Which do not lead to an IRS adjustment. 
v:hatever the exact frequency with which uncontrolled pric.:s 
are available, they are readily available in a number of cases. 
In that regard, shouTdformula apportionment be used even when 
uncontrolled prices are available? 
lations 
Much of the other dat_a presented to demonstrate proble:;-;s with 
t_he current regulations are misleading or unpersuasive. For 
ex,:;mple, the report states that "only" 200 of the 519 multi-
nat.ional corporations in the GAO saruple had Section 482 
c.dj stm,'nts. These data ?tre subject to various interpretations 
aDd do not neces~;arily reflect difficulties 'with applying t:'le 
current Section 482 regulations. Furthermore, the report states 
that Section 482 adjust_me:-lts amounted to "only" $277.5 million 
cor:pared to the total income of the examined firms of $43.5 
billion. The use of total income as the standard for comparjson 
has no logic?tl hasis bec?tuse, among other re?sons, a signific-nt 
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portion of the inco1ne may be unrelat.ed to transaction::; bet..,·::•en 
affiliate,~. Finidly, the ma~1y ex<'!:i)le~; of Socti.on 4t':':l ca::;,_·~> 
discussed in the report are infot·rnative, but they do not 
necessarily relate to the report's major conclusions and the 
recommendations to the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Safe Haven Interest Rate 
•rne report recorrunends that "the treasury adjust the safe 
haven rate as frequently as necessary to realistically reflect 
the current costs of borrowing." As you are aware, a change in 
safe haven interest rate has been implemented effective July 1. 
The Treasury has explored the use of self-·adjusting rate but has 
found that it would lead to many practical prohle::,;s for tax-
payers. However, we anticipate that. the s<1fe haven interest rate 
will be adjusted periodically in the future to reflect major 
changes in interest costs. 
Future Work 
These corrunents are not intended to suggest that there are no 
problems with the application of the current Section 482 
regulations. \'ie realize that the arm's-length principle may have 
both conceptual and practical limitations in a world of inte-
grated firms selling differentiated products. The Treasury has 
examined and will continue to examine specific problems in the 
regulations, and will propose changes if they appear useful or 
warranted. We will also work with the IRS on issues raised by 
the recently cot~leted survey on 482 adjustments. However, 
additionctl analysis is necessary before we can conc-lude that a 
mrJ. jor rev ie\-1 of the regulations is warranted. 
My staff wi 11 be happy to expand on our conm1ents. 
Mr. William J. Anderson 
Director 
General Gove rrw~'"n t Divis ion 
U.S. General Accounting Office 
W~shiD0tOn, D.C. 20548 
Sincerely, 
John~a~ 
Assistant Secretar.f 
(Tax Policy) 
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